306th Fighter Wing | Frantic III

HEADQUARTERS 306th FIGHTER WING

APO 520 U. S. Army

28 July 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report of FRANTIC III Operation

TO : Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 520, U. S. Army

The mission en route.

The task force departed their Italian bases at 0745 of 22 July 1944 with the mission of strafing the Zilistea and Buzau airdromes en route to the Russian bases. These were ideal targets for a shuttle operation as they are slightly beyond the prudent P-38 range when a return to Italian bases is planned after an attack. Rendezvous between the P-38’s and P-51’s was effected and route formation maintained to the IP. The course was laid between Ploesti and Bucharest in order to permit the best direction of approach to the target. At a point approximately thirty miles west of Ploesti, the ceiling dropped to 5,000 feet and the force went under the overcast. A number of miscellaneous airplanes were noted flying around at low altitude. They included JU-52’s, JU-88’s, IAR-80’s, ME-109’s, and trainers. These airplanes were not attacked by our force as the primary target was airplanes on the ground. The formation was at 4,000 feet and considerable heavy flak was encountered. The smoke screen at Ploesti was also effective.

The 82nd Fighter Group strafed Zilistea, Buzau, and three satellite fields. Forty-one airplanes were destroyed on the ground, while fifteen were destroyed in the air by the 82nd and 31st Fighter Groups. Several locomotives were destroyed, while flak positions and flying field installations were effectively strafed. Three P-38’s were lost in this encounter and two P-38’s are missing. The formation was reassembled and proceeded to the Russian bases.

The 31st Group landed at Piryatin, two squadrons of the 82nd at Poltava, and one squadron at Mirogorod. Airplanes were promptly met by maintenance and servicing personnel. The average flying time was approximately five hours.

Conditions at the bases.

In addition to the three main bases, two additional bases were available for dispersal. General Walsh had a plan ready for maximum dispersal and maintenance of airplanes. It was decided to move twenty-four P-51’s from Piryatin and twenty-four P-38’s from Poltava to these two additional fields. The plan was for these dispersed airplanes to return to their bases the following morning, service, and prepare for a ten o’clock take-off on the next day’s mission. It was also arranged that the pilots would eat supper at the main bases before dispersing the airplanes and return to the main bases for breakfast, as messing facilities were not available at the two dispersal fields. Heavy rains had rendered all fields soft, making the dispersal problem a difficult one. However, after the second day, fields were sufficiently dry to allow maximum dispersal. After the second day, a third dispersal field was used, which permitted leaving only 12 P-38’s at Poltava.

Upon arrival it was found that housing conditions at the three bases were satisfactory. It was also found that a number of our ground crews and staff, who had arrived earlier, were suffering from diarrhea or dysentery. After the second day, a number of the pilots became ill and one squadron had nine pilots ill at one time. At some dispersal fields under Russian control, pilots slept on straw ticks and were made uncomfortable by bed bugs and lice. A special report on the mess situation and housing at dispersal fields has been forwarded by the Fifteenth Air Force to MAAF.

Operations

Due to the rapidity of the Russian advance and the 100-mile bomb line restriction, few sutiable targets were within our range. On 23 July the Russian forces were within 88 miles of Mielec Airdrome, and on this date they asked us to hit Mielec within three days. The weather precluded running this mission on either the 23rd or 24th, but the weather was favorable for a strafing mission on 24 July, and this mission was laid on. No bombs were carried due to low ceilings at the target. The Russian line was then 48 miles from Mielec, with some armored units further advanced. As the proposed route to the target was a distance of 610 miles from Poltava, the Russians were requested to permit our force to stage in two forward airdromes on the route back. Colonel Cullen had plans for moving fuel to these proposed airdromes. The Russians refused the use of these fields, and the mission was planned for landings at Piryatin on the return if necessary. Since the weather had prevented photo coverage since 10 July, no late target data were available. Thirty-six P-38’s and 36 P-51’s took off for the mission, and the P-38’s struck the airdrome, destroying nine airplanes and probably destroying seven. Long columns of German trucks were on the road south of Mielec and several trains were observed. These were strafed and fourteen trucks and four locomotives were destroyed, while considerable damage was done to many other trucks and casualties were inflicted on troops. The German columns were in good order, and the trucks were about 100 yards apart.

Turning from the target toward base, a force of about 36 airplanes was encountered, most of which were JU-87’s. In the ensuing encounter, 29 enemy airplanes were destroyed. All of our airplanes returned to base, with some battle damage to a few. The lack on intelligence on the position of the Russian forward elements, the rapidity of their advance, and the lack of forward staging fields rendered a follow-up attack unfeasible.

The mission for 26 July on the route back to Italy was a low altitude fighter sweep of the Bucharest-Ploesti area. It was planned to prevent involving the P-38’s in combat east of this area, as that distance is the maximum prudent range that they can fight and return to base after dropping tanks. Weather forced the formation to about 3,000 feet in the Galatz area, and enemy airplanes were encountered in the Zilistea area. Low altitude combat ensued for about 20 minutes, to a point east of Ploesti. In this engagement 20 enemy airplanes were destroyed in the air and on the ground, and several locomotives were destroyed. Two P-38’s are missing. Accurate heavy flak was encountered and the Ploesti smoke screen was visible. Sixteen P-38’s were left at the Eastern Bases due to pilot illness and mechanical trouble. Twelve of these are scheduled to return to Italy on 29 July. The date of return of the other four airplanes is not now known.

General Walsh, Colonel Cullen, and the members of their staff were most cooperative and helpful in the conduct of this operation. Their plans for dispersal and maintenance of airplanes were efficiently made and they spared no efforts in helping us to execute them.

D. C. STROTHER

Brigadier General, USA

1st Ind A-NFT-sh

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, APO 520, U.S. Army, 28 July 1944

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, APO 650, U. S. Army

The above report on FRANTIC III Operation covers in general the results of the missions performed and is submitted for your information. A more detailed report is being prepared.
Although Meilec Airdrome was the target we planned to attack, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the Russians actually requested this mission. Believe this is the first time they have made a definite request. They were particularly pleased over the destruction of the 26 Stukas.

N. F. TWINING

Major General, USA

Commanding

Narrative Report of Frantic III Operation

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