Mission 165

55BW Mission Summary No. 165, 13 Feb 45

General Summary.

On 13 Feb 45, 62 B-24 a/c (63 a/c scheduled) took off to attack the VIENNA South Goods Yards in AUSTRIA. There were 77 effective sorties and 5 non-effective sorties. The 464th Bomb Group due to PFF failure did not attack the primary target and returned and bombed POLA.

Escort of P-51's joined at 1200-1234 and granted penetration, target and withdrawal support departing at the Spur. 61 a/c were over the VIENNA South Goods Yards from 1235-1236½, from 25,000-25,600', 60 a/c dropping 118.75 tons of 500 lb RDX .1 - .01 bombs. 17 a/c of the 464th Bombardment Group were over POLA at 1335½ and from 25,600' dropped 34 tons of 500 lb RDX .1 - .01 bombs.

Results: VIENNA: 460th strike photos show eight to ten bomb strikes in SE Goods Yard, approximately fifteen across southern half of Ordnance Depot and several on choke point adjacent to northern end of Ordnance Depot. 465th strike photos show entire concentration dispersed over built-up area approximately 2000' W of South Yard. 485th strike photos show approximately ten strikes in Railway Wagon Repair Shops and 18 to 19 strikes in factory area 4000' north of these Repair Shops. 464th strike photos show 25 to 30 hits on naval yard installations located between Submarine Pens and Fort Costello. Several direct hits were the casting and forging shop, machine shop, warehouses and barracks adjacent, and the Torpedo Depot. Flak experienced at the primary target ranged from M-H/A. At POLA flak encountered was M/IAH.

A total of 21 enemy aircraft was observed with no encounters. These aircraft were Me 109's.

Weather: Base on take-off, few stratus and few cirrus; visibility over 15 miles. Route out, base conditions to Adriatic; over water 7/10 stratocumulus with increasing high cloudiness. Over land 6-8/10 cirrus at 20,000', with high bases rising sharply to 25,000' over N Yugo. Patchy cumulus over land with 5-7/10 over mountains and in vicinity of GRAZ. Visibility over 30 miles. Target, no low clouds; 5-7/10 cirrus at 25,000'. Route back, low clouds increasing to 7/10 over N Yugo with tops to 15,000'. 6-8/10 cirrus decreasing to few south of Lake Balaton. Otherwise same as route out. Base on return, few cirrus; visibility unlimited. 60 a/c landed at bases from 1505-1515A. Two a/c are listed as missing.

460th Bomb Group.

At 0630A, 20 a/c were dispatched to bomb the VIENNA South Goods Yards. Group assembly was over base at 0900A. Rendezvous with the 485th and the Wing took place at 0937A. Fighter escort, 12 P-51's, first sighted at 4732N-1437E, furnished penetration, target and withdrawal cover. They left formation at 1335A at 4559N-1617E. At 25,600', 20 a/c were over the PT at 1236½A. A visual run was made on an axis of 45°, 20 a/c dropping 40 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, .1N, .01T fusing. Group experienced IAH flak over VIENNA for approximately ten minutes. Black bursts were observed with a few white and red. Smoke pots effectively concealed the south tip of the city, but LN to NE and north was in the clear. A smoke screen was in operation at SNOV. 19 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1513A. One a/c is missing.

464th Bomb Group.

On 13 Feb 45, 20 a/c of 21 scheduled took off at 0630A to bomb the PT. Form-up, assembly and rendezvous were accomplished as prescribed without incident. There was one early return. 17 a/c were over POLA at 1335A and dropped 34 tons of bombs, 500 lb RDX, .1N, .01T, from 25,600', on an axis of 181°, with a right rally.

Recapitulation:

17 a/c dropped on target - 34 tons 2 a/c jettisoned - 4 tons 1 a/c returned to base - 2 tons Total - 40 tons

Bombing was visual, C-1 automatic pilot being used on run by lead a/c. Flak encountered at POLA was M-IAH, visual tracking fire, with exposure lasting about three minutes. Observation of five Me 109's was reported by one crew near ILIJE at 1233A at 25,500'. E/a came in at five o'clock in abreast as though contemplating attack and then broke away without engagement before reaching firing range. One a/c failed to return. 16 a/c made return landing from 1456-1520A.

465th Bomb Group.

21 a/c of 21 scheduled took off at 0847A to bomb the VIENNA South Goods Depot. Two S2F observed near GRAZ and appeared to be attacking a B-17 returning alone. Outcome of the encounter is not known. Six S2F were seen at 1225A near the IP, MOOSBIERBAUM (4507N-1545E) attacking a formation ahead. It was thought that one of these a/c's was destroyed by the bombers. IAH flak was encountered at the target. Rally was to the left instead of right as briefed. Continued evasive action was taken as the group circled North of VIENNA and East of MOOSBIERBAUM. Crews report that the flak was accurate as to altitude but was almost consistently behind them. 21 a/c were over target at 1235A at 24,300' and dropped 40.75 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, fused .1N, .01T. Target was partially obscured by smoke screen and smoke from previous bombing. All a/c returned safely, landing at 1510A.

485th Bomb Group.

On 13 Feb 45 at 0504A, 21 B-24 a/c scheduled took off to bomb the VIENNA South Goods Yards, in AUSTRIA. Group assembled over home base at 0,000' at 0924A. Wing rendezvous effected at 4200N-1620E at 0956A with the 485th leading followed by the 464th, 465th and 460th Groups. There was one prior return. 20 a/c were over the PT at 1235A. 19 a/c dropped 38 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs fused .1, .01. One a/c did not drop on target because the racks would not release. This a/c jettisoned 1½ tons of bombs at 4725N-1650E and returned 1 ton to base. Bombing was visual with the lead ship using the C-1. The target area was hazy from active smoke generators located in the northern areas of the city which somewhat hampered synchronization on the briefed aiming point. The axis of attack was 58°. No a/c were encountered. Four Me 109's were seen over VIENNA. Four other Me 109's were observed near ZAGREB; these a/c made no attempt to attack. M-IAH flak was encountered over VIENNA for approximately 5 minutes. First bursts of flak were below and behind the formation but became more accurate as the formation settled down on the bomb run, indicating that the flak batteries were tracking the formation. The ineffectiveness of the flak was probably due to the surprise achieved and to the jamming of the enemy radar by the jammer a/c. 21 a/c landed without incident between 1452 and 1513A.

BOMBING AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS

1. Bombing Analysis.

a. 465th Bomb Group. This group flying lead in the Wing formation attacked the target visually by attack units. From the IP the target area was observed to be smoke covered but as the formation continued on the run the specific target became visible. The 46th Wing was flying a collision course with this group visible. The lead bombardier had some difficulty calibrating his sight due to the second attack unit experiencing the same difficulty. There were two malfunctions in this group causing loss of 10 bombs to be salvoed in the target area. One malfunction was caused by a defective B-10 shackle and the other by a faulty electrical system. The C-1 auto-pilot was used by both attack units.

b. 464th Bomb Group. Flying second in the Wing formation this group experienced PFF failures in all aircraft while flying over an overcast. The DR navigator then took them to the third alternate (POLA) where visual conditions had been observed. The lead bombardier cooperating with the DR navigator identified the IP. A visual approach was made along an axis of attack of 181°. There were 4 malfunctions reported and 28 bombs were salvoed in the target area. The bomb-bay doors failed to open on one aircraft and the other three aircraft ground checked satisfactorily. Photos show a heavy concentration of hits in the naval yard installations. Hits were also observed in the naval training station and torpedo depot.

c. 485th Bomb Group. Flying third in the Wing formation this group made a visual run on the primary target. On the bomb run the bombardier accidentally struck the disk speed trim, changing the DS setting. As a result the bombs of this Box fell a considerable distance over the target area. Charlie Box leader was forced to dim to the left of the DPI as Baker Box was flying directly overhead.

d. 460th Bomb Group. Flying last in the Wing formation this group made a visual run. Due to smoke from previous bombing and a cloud cover at the IP, the bombardier called for a PFF run. After the PFF had turned the aircraft on the run the IPP became visible and the bombardier took over. Due to a very great change in the astro information, the bombardier had difficulty killing rate. A last minute rate correction was made just as the bombs were away. Bombs were seen to fall seven or eight hundred feet short of the MPI. Bombardier leading the second attack wave had difficulty finding the aiming point due to smoke pots and synchronized on an H/T near the briefed aiming point.

2. Navigation Analysis.

a. A line rendezvous was scheduled to a position (4200N-1620E). The 465th Group departed from the position on course at 0955A, one minute ahead of schedule, followed by the 464th, 485th and 460th Groups in that order. The altitude of the 465th was 5,000' as briefed. During the line rendezvous two boxes from the 47th Wing fell in between the 485th and 460th Groups, but shortly after disengaged successfully from the Wing formation.

b. The course flown was slightly to the right of that briefed, the 465th passing four miles to the right of VLR at 1055A at an altitude of 16,600'. This line was flown 4.8 miles ahead of schedule. The 465th continued to the initial point, passing over TOPLICE, PTUJ, GRAZ and TROGLOMIO. In the vicinity of TROGLOMIO, the lead, lost the PFF set in the lead aircraft, the deputy lead lost an engine, and so Charlie Box was directed to take over the group lead. The Charlie Box leader turned to the right instead of to the left in taking over the group formation, causing considerable confusion in the group formation. Finally the deputy group lead took over.

By this time the group had lost Wing formation. Faulty PFF readings caused the group to proceed to the west of STEYR (4756N-1430E) where the group leader again took over command of the formation and changed course to bomb POLA. SAN LORENZO DI NETA was made known as the initial point. The group rallied slightly to the right of the north tip of Lake Balaton in the vicinity of the initial point. The 465th Group was forced to rally to the left off the target when it became apparent that the prescribed right rally would make them pass under two of the groups of the 47th Wing which were making its bomb run. They proceeded to SAINT FOLTEN and from there made good a course to FURSTENFELD (4704N-1604E) and from there the group proceeded to base via SISAK. The 465th Group rallied off the target as briefed to ILLIRITZ and went from there to SISAK to SINAK and to base by the briefed route. The 460th Group rallied to the left to a position (4337N-1546E) and returned to base via VARAZDIN and SISAK.

c. The weather caused no difficulties except in the case of the 464th Group. When they had difficulty with their PFF sets, there was a 10/10 undercast. Over most of the route it was possible to use pilotage checkpoints. No route flak was encountered.

d. The 464th passed directly over their initial point, SAN LORENZO DI NETA and the bomb run was visual. The 465th could not see the initial point, MOOSBIERBAUM. The bomb run was started by sighting on the target area, which was visible. The 485th Group turned on the bomb run six miles east of the initial point and was able to make a visual run. The 460th Group turned on the initial point by PFF and the first quarter of the bomb run was by axis method. However, the bombs were dropped visually. The 485th Group reported considerable difficulty on the bomb run due to excessive drift. Bomb run data follows:

GROUP	TOT TIME	AZMT	BRNG ALT
465	1236A	58 degrees	24,300 feet
464 (POLA)	1335A	181 degrees	25,600 feet
485	1235A	58 degrees	25,000 feet
460	1236A	45 degrees	25,600 feet

e. 465th Group - Navigation good - Log good. 464th Group - Navigation good - Log good. 485th Group - Navigation good - Log good. 460th Group - Navigation good - Log good.

f. There is one important lesson to be learned from the operation, the importance of accurate timing at the keypoint. The 465th departed from the rendezvous one minute ahead of schedule, but by the time they reached the keypoint they were five minutes early. It is to be assumed that the 46th Wing was slightly late. At any rate prop wash from the 47th caused some trouble for the 485th Group, and in the target area the last group of that Wing prevented the 465th from executing the briefed rally. The early arrival at the keypoint had reduced the calculated interval between the two wings from eight minutes to considerably less.

3. Pathfinder Navigation Analysis.

a. 465th Bomb Group. Lead Mickey Operator obtained several fixes that were relayed to the DR Navigator, however the burden of the navigation was done by the pilotage navigator. The turn over IP was visual and bombs were released using visual methods. Mickey Operator followed through on the bomb run.

b. 464th Bomb Group. Mickey Operator in the lead plane experienced trouble with his H2X equipment after crossing the YUGO coast. All attempts to remedy the difficulties were of no avail so it was decided by the lead pilot to relinquish the group lead. The deputy lead was unable to take over due to an engine failure so it was elected to bomb POLA targets. A visual run was made with good results. There was one other set malfunction.

c. 465th Bomb Group. PFF was used solely as an aid to navigation as weather was CAVU. Numerous PFF fixes were relayed to the navigator. The Mickey Operator turned the formation over the IP and gave the first course correction but then the bombardier was able to identify the target and a visual bomb run was made.

d. 460th Bomb Group. Lead PFF operator assisted in the navigation to and from the target. Visibility was good; however, radar fixes were used as a check. The Mickey Operator made the turn at the IP and gave the pilot three course corrections of five degrees each. The first sighting cycle was given to the bombardier but remainder of run was visual. Mickey Operators assisted in the navigation but bomb run was visual. Fixes were transmitted to the group every thirty minutes.

FIGHTER ESCORT

325th Fighter Group

40 P-51's took off at 1010A. 38 effective sorties. 2 non-effective sorties due to mechanical trouble. 1 P-51 provided escort for crippled B-24 from rendezvous area 1230A to 4500N-1500E at 1305A. 28 P-51's R/V with bombers (4730N-1437E) 1220A. 28 P-51's provided target cover (not effecting R/V) from 1230-1250A. 8 P-51's provided target cover from 1230-1300A. 36 P-51's down at base 1450A.

36 P-51's arrived at R/V point at assigned time, circled, and when unable to establish contact with assigned bombers, proceeded NE. 28 P-51's effected R/V with 55th Wing at 4750N-1437E at 24-25,000'. 28 P-51's provided target cover from 1230-1250A, at 26,000'. 8 P-51's unable to contact bombers provided target cover for bomber force from 1250-1300A, 27-28,000'. 28 P-51's provided withdrawal cover to 4330N-1545E, 1405A, 14,000'. 8 P-51's provided withdrawal cover for 47th Bomb Wing to 4415N-1605E, 1406A, 17,000'. Groups in rear of the force were widely spread out necessitating a constant check on the bomber formation in order to effect rendezvous.

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