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General Summary. On 19 February 1945 between 0730-0801A, 112 B-24 a/c of the 5/c scheduled took off to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. There were 93 effective sorties and 19 non-effective sorties.
Group assemblies were effected generally as ordered; one Bombardment Group experienced great difficulty due to cloud conditions in assembly area. This factor affected line and Wing rendezvous which were late and never satisfactorily effected and affected mid-route rendezvous with fighter escort. Fighter escort was excellent; individual groups between 1014-1047A; escort consisting of P-51 and P-38 a/c gave PTF cover to primary target and alternate targets.
Escort remained with formation until 1301A.
95 a/c were over targets between 1251A-1307A. 24 a/c dropped 48 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, fused .1/.01T, from 24,500' at 1255A on WIETZLEISDORF A/Y in VIENNA; 24 a/c dropped 47 tons of 500 lb RDX bombs, fused .1/.01T, from 24,400-25,000' at 1251A on GRAZ SE M/Y; 35 a/c dropped 76.75 tons (same specifications) on targets of opportunity. 11 a/c jettisoned 13.25 tons, 8 a/c returned 16 tons to bases.
Flak at VIENNA was M-IAH, at GRAZ was SIH. SIH was encountered at POLA, MARIBOR and ZAGREB. A total of 56 e/a were seen. There were no encounters.
460th Bomb Group. On 19 Feb 45 at 0730A, 28 scheduled a/c were dispatched to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. There were 23 effective and 5 non-effective sorties.
Group assembly was over the base at 0840A and rendezvous with two groups of the Wing was accomplished at 0849A. The 465th did not make rendezvous with the formation. Fighter escort, 40 P-38's, first sighted at 1047A at 4538N-14473E, furnished penetration target and withdrawal cover, leaving formation at 1301A at 4613N-1505E.
Due to 120 knot cross wind, the group was unable to bomb the primary target. The group leader elected to bomb the first of the first alternate target. At 24,400', 11 a/c, the first attack unit, dropped 21.25 tons of 500 lb RDX .1/.01 bombs at 1251A at 1700'. Photographs show a good concentration of bombs fell on the SE M/Y, causing damage to rolling stock and installations. One direct hit on a bridge near the labor camp. Group leader used auto-pilot on the bomb run. Group leader reported communications as satisfactory.
The second attack unit failed to see the leader drop on GRAZ. Baker box of this unit bombed POLA, this box bombed JUDENBURG and PÖHLSDORF. At KLAGENFURT bombs fell in the center of the town. At POLA the briefed target was missed. No results were observed at PÖHLSDORF.
Recapitulation: 11 a/c dropped 21.25 tons, GRAZ SE M/Y, 1251, 24400', 170° 4 a/c dropped 8.00 tons, POLA Harbor, 1245, 22000', 165° 3 a/c dropped 4.75 tons, PÖHLSDORF, 1216, 22000', 280° 3 a/c dropped 6.00 tons, KLAGENFURT, 1232, 23000', 90° 1 a/c dropped 2.00 tons, FIUME, 1253, 22000', 170°
Disposition of bomb load on one a/c at a friendly field is unknown. One a/c failed to bomb due to bomb-bay doors failing to operate. Bomb load was jettisoned in the ADRIATIC. Two a/c jettisoned two tons in the ADRIATIC.
The Group met SIH flak over GRAZ, bursts trailing the formation, and SIH flak over POLA.
At 1210A six to eight contrails were seen at 35,000', 20 miles south of MICHELBACH. These twin-engine e/a, flying in pairs, circled the formation at 30,000' but did not attack. E/a were reported as Me-262's, painted a dark grey.
Route was flown as briefed to the IP, where the formation turned back and bombed GRAZ.
22 a/c returned to base with a mean landing time of 1520A. Two a/c landed at friendly fields.
464th Bomb Group. On 19 Feb 45, 28 scheduled a/c took off at 0740A to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. Because of increasingly adverse winds encountered upon nearing the IP for the Primary Target, the First Alternate Target, GRAZ SE M/Y, was attacked, pursuant to decision of the Wing Leader. There were 25 effective and 3 non-effective sorties.
Hampered slightly by weather, form-up and assembly was good between BERLETTA and ANDRIA. Upon making rendezvous this group fell into second position when the 465th and 455th Groups were late at arrival.
23 a/c dropped 45.75 tons of bombs (500 lb RDX .1/.01) on the GRAZ SE M/Y from 25,000' at 1251A on an axis of 170°, with a left rally.
Recapitulation: 23 a/c dropped on 1st Alternate Target 45.75 tons 2 a/c dropped on targets of opportunity 4.00 tons 2 a/c jettisoned 2.25 tons 2 a/c returned to base 4.00 tons Total 56.00 tons
Bombing was visual, each attack unit leader using C-1 auto-pilot. Bomb strike photos show a heavy concentration of hits among several columns of freight cars in the center of the marshalling yards. This pattern of hits extended over into the warehouse area along the east side of the yards. At the north end of the yard there were at least two hits on the choke point and two more at either side of the roundhouse. Approximately 20 more hits fell across the south end of the railroad yard, with additional strikes on and to the west toward the labor camp. Other hits probably fell in the smoke lying across the south end of the yard.
Flak encountered at the target was SIH and MIH, most of the crews reporting SIH, with exposure limited to two minutes.
Rendezvous was made with 40 P-38's at 1047A at 4451N-14593E, providing good PTF cover, and were last seen at 1300A at 4613N-1505E.
25-30 unidentified aircraft believed SEF were observed at ZELTWEG A/D at 1230A from 25,000'.
24 a/c made return landings, commencing at 1445A. 1 a/c landed at a friendly field; 2 a/c are missing.
Route was flown substantially as briefed to MOOS, thence to GRAZ, without using the prescribed IP for the alternate target.
455th Bomb Group. On 19 Feb 45 at 0801A, 28 scheduled a/c took off to bomb the WIETZLEISDORF M/Y at VIENNA. There were 21 effective and 4 non-effective sorties.
Group assembled approximately 15 miles north of ANDRIA at 9000', 0850A. The Wing assembled between ANDRIA and the Spur at 0902 at 10,000'. An escort of P-38's joined at 1044A near SARAJEVO and departed at the target area. It is believed that the escort accompanied the other groups of this Wing to the first alternate target.
4 Me-109's were seen between MOOS and the IP at 1227A, at 10,000', heading south. Two unidentified fighters flying in the target area at 5000', heading south. No enemy aircraft were encountered.
Flak at the target was moderate to intense, accurate heavy. Scant flak was encountered at MARIBOR and GRAZ.
24 a/c arrived over the target at 1255A, 24,500', dropping 48 tons of 500 lb RDX .1/.01 bombs on the WIETZLEISDORF M/Y. Bomb strike photos show hits in the west choke point and a few hits just across the yards in a built up area. Bombing was visual, using C-1 auto-pilot.
22 a/c landed at base at 1500A. One a/c landed at PRKOS A/D refueled and returned to base at 1800A. Another landed at VIS.
485th Bomb Group. On 19 Feb 45 at 0735A, 28 a/c took off to bomb a target in AUSTRIA. There were 21 effective and 7 non-effective sorties.
Difficulty was experienced on assembly due to weather conditions over the base. Able box formed over the field with the leader heading south, there being a break in the weather in that direction. Without the Uphill weather ship the leader had to rely on his judgment as to the best area in which to assemble the formation. Flying through a trough to the coast line of the Gulf of Taranto, where the box broke out on top of the undercast at 7,000', the leader called all the boxes to rejoin to the A-BOX. It was during this period assembly would be made by using the radio compass. The Group formation was completed at 0850A; however, at that time Dog box was leading somewhat behind.
Uphill was called and advised that the Group would be 7 to 8 minutes late at rendezvous point. It was believed that the Wing formation could be intercepted at the first turn point. An interception course was flown and the formation was sighted off the Spur. The leader called the Wing leader, asking the formation to slow down until the Group could join it. During this time the Group had attained its briefed altitude.
The leader, realizing the necessity of being in the formation, especially over enemy territory, exerted every effort to catch the Groups ahead. At this time three boxes were in good formation but Dog box was still lagging. Approximately half way to the primary target, #4 turbo of the lead ship went bad. The formation was at 15,000' at that time. The air speed became very erratic, making it difficult for the ships to hold formation.
Fighter escort, consisting of approximately 40 P-38's, joined the formation at 1044A at 4540N-1505E. They were last observed at MARIBOR at 4720N-1440E.
Opposite GRAZ the formation began to scatter with the ships slowed down, showing concern over their gas supply. The leader slowed down his a/c in an effort to allow the formation to reform. The Wing formation continued on course leaving the Group behind. The leader decided to abandon the primary target. The formation circled around BRUCK to the north and attempted to bomb the 1st Alternate Target. Dog box had left the formation at some point prior to this. The leader had Baker box close in tight and instructed Charlie box to assume the proper interval for a bomb run on this target. The weather was CAVU but a very strong cross wind was blowing. The IP was not identified, and before the bombardier could set up the course the formation was over the target with no chance to drop the bombs. The heading was 270°. The leader took the a/c off the C-1 and took over manually.
It was decided to bomb the 2nd Alternate Target. The formation leveled off and not having time to put a/c back on C-1, this bomb run had to be made on PDI. Two big corrections were made, and before synchronization could be completed, the tail wind being very strong, carried the formation over the target before bombs could be released.
The leader then advised the formation that he was heading for POLA. In order to conserve gas, let-down was started as soon as the new heading was adopted. At this time 12 a/c remained with the formation. The target was identified and a bomb run begun on a heading of 150°. For some reason, several of the a/c dropped early. 9 a/c dropped 18 tons of 500 lb RDX .1/.01 bombs from 22,000' at 1320A. Dog box made an individual run on MARIBOR. 5 a/c dropped 10 tons of bombs from 23,500' at 1340A, heading of 90°. Both targets were bombed by visual means with lead ships using the auto-pilot.
Recapitulation: 3 early returns brought back 6 tons 1 early return jettisoned 2 tons 9 a/c dropped on POLA 18 tons 5 a/c dropped on MARIBOR 10 tons 3 a/c jettisoned 6 tons 7 a/c bombs unaccounted for 14 tons Total 56 tons
Results were generally poor. MARIBOR: Photographs indicate the bombs fell in an open area outside the city, causing no military damage. POLA: Photographs show most of the bombs fell in the bay; however, a direct hit was obtained on a coal quay and one hit and a near miss on the adjacent cement factory.
No e/a were encountered. In the KLAGENFURT area 4 unidentified a/c were observed. These a/c were believed to have been jet-propelled. At JUDENBURG, 12 SE a/c were observed on a field. Flak was experienced in three areas: GRAZ - SIH, MARIBOR - SIH, POLA - SIH
PTF was used only for navigational aids. All sets worked satisfactorily.
One a/c crash-landed at STERPARONE, details unknown. 5 a/c landed at friendly fields. One a/c is missing. 17 a/c returned to base, mean landing time 1435A.
BOMBING AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS
Bombing Analysis. A normal effort of the 460th, 464th, 465th and 485th Bomb Groups of the 55th Bomb Wing was dispatched against the VIENNA WIETZLEISDORF A/Y on 19 February 1945.
460th Group: This group led the Wing formation. Approximately 30 minutes before the IP for the primary target was reached, the lead bombardier was notified by his navigator that the drift on the briefed axis of attack would be 36° right. As this was more than the bomb sight will take, a decision was made to bomb the first alternate target, GRAZ. Due to the unusually strong winds that were met at the bombing altitude it was found to be impossible to hit the briefed IP. A turn was made over a chosen IP and a normal visual run was begun. The search knob on the bomb sight of the lead bombardier was frozen but this did not hamper the run. The bombs were away in a normal manner with no malfunctions reported.
The second attack unit was late getting airborne and was unable to catch the lead attack unit. This unit attached itself to another group but after a short time the lead pilot may have been pulling too much power and using their gasoline up too quickly so he chose to bomb a target of opportunity. KLAGENFURT was chosen as the target. The target was identified in time to insure a smooth bombing run. As the lead aircraft had a malfunction in his bombsight and was unable to make any corrections in course he tried to pull out of position half way down the bomb run. When he did this the other box broke up and only two aircraft dropped their bombs on the target. As they were returning to the home base the crew of the lead aircraft decided to bomb POLA. As no correction could be made in course the bombs fell a bit to the left of the aiming point.
Dog box was also delayed on take-off and was unable to catch the rest of the formation until just prior to the IP for the primary target. During the rally from this point the position in the group formation was again lost. This box was trailing the group when the GRAZ M/Y was attacked but since there wasn't any radio contact with the group leader no pass was made at this target. The lead bombardier and his navigator decided to bomb POLA. A turn was made over the briefed IP and a normal visual run was started. The high speed of the wind had not been taken into consideration and the bomb run was only 10 seconds long. Impacts were well over the target.
485th Group: This group flying second in the Wing formation also turned away from the primary target when it became apparent that drift on the briefed heading would be too much 35° for radar. The briefed IP for POLA was seen but due to the high speed of the wind the turn towards the target had to be made short of the IP. This changed the axis of attack by 35°. A smooth run was reported by the leaders of the first and second attack units. There were no malfunctions reported by this group. The lead of Dog box was unable to maintain his position in the group formation with bomb load still aboard. As a result the lead bombardier picked out an aiming point on a railroad south of MARIBOR. When he dropped his bombs after a normal run the entire box dropped with him.
465th Group: This group flying third in the Wing formation was the only group from this Wing to hit the assigned primary target. The pilot turned short of the IP to maintain the Wing formation. When it was seen that the lead two groups were not heading towards the primary target a turn was made to the left so the primary target could be picked up. The lead bombardier was able to pick up the target in ample time. A visual run was made. The bombs from the lead aircraft are believed to have fallen short as the bombardier accidentally hit his toggle switch just before bombs away. There was only one malfunction reported. One aircraft had some bombs hang up and these were salvoed a short distance past the bombs away. Some evasive action was flown for a short while before the bomb run started.
464th Group: This group was flying fourth and last in the Wing formation. When the Wing leader relied on the radio and stated that he was going to the first alternate this formation turned towards that target. Due to the extremely high winds the briefed IP could not be used. A heading of 173° was taken up for the bomb run. The first attack unit leader reported no troubles but the second attack unit lead was unable to drop his bombs due to inoperative bomb doors. The deputy leader had been following through on the bomb run and dropped his bombs. The rest of this box also dropped at the same time. There were six malfunctions reported in this group. Three were due to bomb bay doors, one was due to a defective A-2 release, and the other two failed to show any trouble on the ground.
Navigation Analysis.
The 460th Group was scheduled to lead the line rendezvous from ANDRIA to a position (4200N-1805E) with the 485th, 465th and 464th Groups following in that order. The 460th was over ANDRIA at 0849A, two minutes late, and turned on course at a position (4200N-16452E) at 0914A. The 485th Group was late in assembly because of adverse weather conditions over its field, and was 40 miles behind the lead group at a position (4200N-1620E). It was, therefore, necessary for the 485th Group to maintain a higher indicated airspeed in an attempt to get into its correct position. The 465th Group passed over ANDRIA at 0854. The 464th Group formed in an area around BERLETTA and MANFREDONIA because of adverse weather in the regular rendezvous areas. The 465th was at a position (4103N-1642E) at 0852A at an altitude of 11,500', and formed behind the 460th at a position (4200N-1630E) at 0917A.
The briefed course was flown on penetration. The Wing started to climb to bombing altitude of 24,500' at 0930A at a position (4251A-1615E). The YUGOSALVIAN coast was crossed at GULF ISLAND (4551N-1450E) at 17,000', 14 minutes late and 1000' higher than scheduled. This delay in time was because of much greater winds than had been anticipated. The formation was over the initial point, MICHELBACH (4636N-1545E) at 1235A. The lead Bomb Group decided that since there would be an excess of 36° drift on the briefed axis of attack and a time delay of 30 seconds, it would bomb the first alternate target and not the primary target. The group turned off the bomb run at a position (4805N-1605E). The box of the second attack unit became separated from the rest of the formation. A ship of this box went to the KLAGENFURT area to bomb. The lead aircraft in this element left the bomb run, however, when the bomb sight became inoperative. This caused the box to break up. Two aircraft bombed KLAGENFURT. Three aircraft then proceeded to drop bombs at PÖHLSDORF (4712E-1441E). The box leader dropped on FIUME. The 485th Group leader decided that because of the head winds in excess of 60 knots and the great amount of gas already consumed, the group would bomb the first alternate target. The turn on GRAZ was too close on the target, however, so the leader then decided on MARIBOR. Again, because of the strong winds and the short distance, the bombardier was unable to synchronize on the target. The third alternate, POLA, was bombed by the rest of the group formation. The 465th Group used the turn on IP to turn on the initial point of the primary target. The rally was as briefed, and the route back was flown as briefed with the exception of slight deviations from course to avoid route flak. The 464th Group reached a position (4451N-1450E) at 1039A at 20,000'. The course from there to JUDENBURG (4710N-1440E) was flown on an average of twelve miles to the right of course in order to keep Wing formation. At 1235A, the group was at a position (4750N-1549E) at 25,000', when it was decided to bomb the first alternate target because of the excessive amount of drift on the briefed axis of attack on the primary target. The initial point (4725N-1520E) which was used to start the bomb run on the first alternate was reached at 1245A at 25,000'.
An approximate head wind in excess of 90 knots caused the Wing formation to be late all along the route to the target. It also caused great difficulty for the groups when they attempted to turn on the briefed axis of attack at the initial point. No route difficulties were caused by route flak.
Bomb run data: GROUP AXIS TOT TIME BMBG ALT 460 170° 1254A 24,400' 464 170° 1250A 25,000' 465 90° 1257A 24,500' 485 155° 1320A 23,000'
Pathfinder Navigation Analysis.
460th Group: Visibility was excellent over most of the route to the target so PTF was used only as a check on the DR navigator. The pilotage navigator assumed the burden of the navigation. Lead mickey operator furnished the navigator with approximately 15 fixes. Bombing was entirely by visual methods. On the return passage PTF operator directed the formation around known flak positions when visibility was restricted. No equipment malfunctions were reported.
465th Group: PTF was used only as a aid to navigation as visibility was good enroute to the target. The PTF operator was instrumental in avoiding many known flak spots and was able to assist the bombardier in locating the target. Approximately 5 fixes were given to the navigator. 10 fixes were given to the bombardier about fifteen minutes. Coordination between mickey operator and bombardier and navigator was excellent.
465th Group: The lead Pathfinder operator obtained numerous fixes which were used to keep the group on the briefed course. Fixes were also used by the navigator in determining wind directions and velocity. The lead mickey operator put the formation on course to the target and followed through on the bomb run but bombs were dropped using visual methods. No equipment malfunctions were reported.
464th Group: Due to a partial undercast at rendezvous the lead mickey operator was able to be of valuable assistance to the navigator by supplying frequent fixes. Enroute to the target Pathfinder operator supplied the navigator with fixes and informed him of known flak positions. At the IP for the primary target the Wing leader gave the order to bomb first alternate target. Visibility was good so the bombardier made a visual run with the mickey operator following through. All ECM equipment was in excellent working order.
FIGHTER ESCORT
14th Fighter Group. To provide escort on penetration, at target and on withdrawal, and dispensing chaff, for the 55th Wing attacking targets in AUSTRIA, 34 P-38's took off at 0835A (5 early returns, mechanical). 34 P-38's penetrated with bombers along a line parallel to bomb run from IP (MICHELBACH) to target and withdrawal. 34 P-38's gave effective escort southward to 4735N-1505E where 12 P-38's broke off on bombing and strafing mission. 22 P-38's escorted 55th Wing to GRAZ 1247/1300 to 4631N - 4710/1510 1255/1305. 33 P-38's down at base 1445. 1 P-38 lost.
27 P-38's of 55th Wing a/c at target 55th Wing a/c at 24,500' at 4404/1455 at 1300A, P/V having returned early. 3 P-38's returned early after R/V had been effected. 34 P-38's continued on IP and on bomb run toward primary target when at 1232A bombers called saying they would bomb first alternate. Maximum point of penetration of escort 4812/1616. All groups of Bomb Wing made 180° turn in place and headed south to GRAZ. At 4736/1605 12 P-38's fell out of formation to execute bombing and strafing plans. 22 P-38's continued from that continued co-ordinate to GRAZ where 14 P-38's dropped chaff bombs at 24/28000'. P-38's were in two echelon formations in target area from 1247/1300A passing through target on respective headings of 200° and 240°. In turning from primary target bomb formation became somewhat strung out. 14 P-38's departed 55th Wing at 4623/1446 at 1255A at 27000'. 8 P-38's departed 55th Wing 4710/1510 at 1305A at 24000'.
Flak: S/MIH observed at GRAZ. Weather: CAVU at primary; hazy haze and partial coverage by smoke pots. Alternate target hazy. Radio security: General discipline poor. 12 P-38's dropped 43 chaff bombs simultaneously at 1250A at 4706/1528 from 28000' on bomber level 1/2 mile behind on a heading of 200°, IAS 210 mph. P-38's of this squadron had been unable to catch the head of bomb formation on run to alternate. No warning had been given by bomb formation. 2 P-38's dropped 8 chaff bombs at 1300A simultaneously at 4705/1528 from 24000' 1/4 mile ahead, 2000' above and 500' to left of bombers, at 220 mph IAS on heading of 240°.
82nd Fighter Group. To drop chaff and to provide PTT escort for 55th Wing attacking targets in AUSTRIA, 46 P-38's took off at 0655A; 10 early returns (6 mechanical, 3 aborts). P-38's penetrated to target areas, 1 of which 11 dropped 43 chaff bombs ahead of lead group; 34 P-38's gave PTT escort at GRAZ. 34 P-38's down at 1425A, 1 landed at a Russian field, 1 P-38 down at 1340A. One early returning P-38 lost (pilot safe).
Route: Base to JUDENBURG (R/V), 400 miles; to MOOS, 35 miles to MICHELBACH (IP), 56 miles; to target, 32 miles; to VIENNA, 36 miles; to SARVAR, 35 miles; to VASVVEC, 100 miles; to base, 312 miles Total mileage: 1006 miles.
P-38's were off at 0655A and went on course as briefed. P-38's met bombers of 55th Wing a short distance after landfall east of FIUME. Rendezvous was effected from 1148A to 1155A, at 24,000 to 25,000', from 15 miles west of FIUME to 4600E-1445E. Bombers were 35 minutes late at briefed rendezvous and P-38's made several 180° turns in this area in an attempt to locate proper wings. 5 P-38's were early near or at landfall; 1 P-38 escorted 1 B-24 from just east of MOOS (1205A); 2 P-38's returned from near ST. POLTEN (1230A); 13 P-38's escorted 1 B-24 from just south of the IP at 1400A; 11 a/c P-38's dropped 43 chaff bombs from 1237-1240A; 5 P-38's escorted 3 B-24's from 24,000' ahead of 55th Wing on bomb run. Six P-38's circled until 1257A. 14 P-38's escorted B-24's and furnished PTT for their attack on GRAZ; last P-38's departed at 1325A at 25,000' at approximately 35 miles southeast of FIUME, with the exception of 2 P-38's that escorted a crippled B-24 from 4635/1430E to a Russian base.
Flak: SIH from MARIBOR; SIH from POLA; S/L from PECS (noted 2 P-38's). Weather: Overcast to 10/12,000' to north of FIUME, and clear beyond. Target clear with slight haze. Radio security was satisfactory. 46 aircraft sorties; 34 effective sorties, 7 non-effective sorties.
Chaffing: No. a/c dropping: 11. No. chaff bombs and fusing: 43 chaff bombs, fuse at 15 and 17 seconds. Initial dropping: 1237A. Final dropping: 1240A. Axis of dropping: 77°. Altitude of dropping: 25,000'. Relative position: 2,000' above and 2 miles ahead of bombers at 77°. 2,000' above and 3½ miles ahead at final point of dropping. Method used to determine IP of chaffing: visual. Lead bombers: 55th Wing (Group not identified). One chaff bomb returned to base due to rack malfunction.
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