Unit History, December 1944

PART II. REPORT ON OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR 1944

The first combat mission of the 55th Bombardment Wing (HV) was flown on 19 March 1944, by the 460th Bombardment Group against the M/T and Quays of METKOVI?, YUGOSLAVIA. On May the 460th and 464th Bombardment Groups attacked the M/Yards and Oil Storage at PLOESTI, RUMANIA, M/Y, the 464th and 465th attacked enemy troop concentrations at PODGORICA, YUGOSLAVIA. The 460th, 464th and 465th attacked the WIENER NEUSTADT A/C factory on 10 May, and on the same order the 465th Bombardment Group bombed the KNIN, YUGOSLAVIA, M/Y, thus marking the day on which the Wing became fully operational.

Between 19 March and 31 December 1944 the Wing flew 153 effective missions. In this period the 460th Bombardment Group flew 145, the 464th 125, the 465th 127, and the 485th 125 effective missions. 13 missions were flown in March, 15 in April, 19 in May, 17 in June, 19 in July, 22 in August, 15 in September, 10 in October, 16 in November, and 18 in December.

These 153 Wing missions were against targets in 9 countries ( or 10, if GERMANY and AUSTRIA are considered as two countries): GERMANY and AUSTRIA (57), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (8), POLAND (2), RUMANIA (18), FRANCE (13), HUNGARY (14), YUGOSLAVIA (14), GREECE (1), and ITALY (26).

Fifty one missions were dispatched against Marshalling Yards, 10 against Bridges, 11 against Airdromes, 10 against aircraft factories, 10 against other industrial targets, 6 against Harbors, 4 against troop concentrations, 43 against Oil Refineries and Oil Storage, 5 against Ordnance Depots and Stores, and 3 against coastal gun positions.

Operations naturally followed, and as naturally reflect, the development of the war in EUROPE. After insofar as possible dispatching the Bombardment Groups on "freshmen" missions (directed against relatively lightly defended targets in YUGOSLAVIA), targets of major importance to the war effort were assigned. The Wing became operational shortly after the concentrated and coordinated attacks of USAAF upon the German aircraft industry, but was active in the final stages of this all-out effort. It participated fully in the spring campaign against objectives vital to ITALY, and was conspicuously successful in destroying its assigned oil targets. The most useful application of strategic bombing to communications, particularly to Marshalling Yards, has accounted for the largest number of the Wing's missions. Supplementary to this were the 6 missions against Harbors and their installations.

Of special interest and particular significance were the missions flown as part of the coordination with ground troops. Besides limited operations of this type in YUGOSLAVIA, the WING functioned in the attack which overran the Adolph Hitler Line in ITALY, a related attack in the BOLOGNA (ITALY) area, and "Operation Dragoon" - the invasion of Southern FRANCE.

The relation of the Wing's missions in the BALKANS to the westward sweep of the Russian armies becomes evident in the review of its attacks upon Marshalling Yards and Bridges in RUMANIA and HUNGARY.

Indeed, the restriction of potential targets by the Allied occupations of FRANCE, RUMANIA, GREECE, and HUNGARY is clearly reflected in the succession of Wing missions.

This restriction has had two immediate effects: as FRANCE, RUMANIA, GREECE, much of YUGOSLAVIA, and most of HUNGARY cease to contain targets the major effort of the Wing is limited to GERMANY and AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND and North ITALY. Second, as the seasonal change brought protracted periods of weather unsuitable for visual bombing, the dependence upon Pathfinder equipment and methods becomes necessary. It has resulted that targets in GERMANY and AUSTRIA have familiar area visual or radar targets. VIENNA, BLECHHAMMER, and LINZ are the most familiar names on Operations Orders, and every possible method of attacking these targets has by the end of 1944 being utilized; if targets could not be seen visually they were bombed by Pathfinder, and, if weather precluded formation flying in daylight, individual PFF aircraft bombed by day or - indeed, and by night, for the dispatch of PFF aircraft to bomb individually by day and by night was begun in November.

As the calendar year drew to its close, the scale of effort, which had reached its highest point in August and its low point (during the period in which the Wing was fully operational) in October, began to rise little by little and rose still higher in December. In most cases at this time missions required long - sometimes extreme - penetration of GERMANY, and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Opposition by enemy aircraft, which had fallen off in August and was negligible from September through November, was again experienced, and the flak defense of the enemy's last remaining vital targets was steadily increased. Oil, industry, airdromes, and communications in GERMANY, AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, HUNGARY, and ITALY remained. The scope of the operational theater was greatly restricted, but this resulted in the greater concentration of sustained effort against the enemy in his last defensive effort.

II PERSONNEL A-1

A summary of the personnel management problems of the Wing can be subdivided into two main categories: (1) Personnel necessary for manning the Ground Echelon of the various units, and (2) Combat Crew Personnel.

Based upon table of organization authorizations, no serious difficulties were experienced in obtaining adequate personnel for the manning of the various units of the Wing exclusive of pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and aircraft maintenance specialists. Numerically, the strength of each unit without these specialties averaged very close to the authorized strength, the tendency being to average slightly plus. A fair estimate would be that the tactical units have averaged approximately 10% under the authorized strength in aircraft maintenance technicians which has been counteracted by 10% to 12% overage of other enlisted personnel.

The only serious setback in personnel management was experienced during the month of August when it was necessary for the Wing to furnish a cadre of approximately 200 enlisted specialists in critical maintenance categories for the Very Heavy Bombardment Program. Adequately trained replacements were never furnished commensurate with the losses. The majority of the replacements were still classified as basics and had been taken from Technical Training Command schools prior to graduation.

With reference to combat crew personnel the average assigned strength for the year ran considerably lower than authorized. During the first half of the year an average of approximately 60% of the authorized combat crews per Bombardment Group was maintained, which was considerably lowered during the months of June, July, and August, then for a period it was believed operations would have to be seriously curtailed due to lack of personnel. The shortage was attributed to a high attrition rate and much lower rate of arrival of replacements than had been requested. During the autumn months the replacement crews arrived in considerable quantity and the year was concluded with an average of approximately 10% of the authorized crews per Bombardment Group.

Based upon actual operating experiences it has been determined that, for efficient operations, a general increase of personnel over present T/O authorization is necessary in two categories: (1) those to provide for services normally furnished by an Air Base Squadron such as Air Base Security, operation of Post Exchange and recreation facilities, mess personnel for the operation and maintenance of synthetic training devices, and (2) a general increase in aircraft maintenance personnel in tactical elements in proportion to the increased authorization for operational aircraft.

Continued emphasis has been placed upon a numerical balance of all military occupational specialties between various units of the command. The routine statistical summaries indicate that a high degree of success was achieved insofar as pertains to both ground and air echelons.

Continued stress has been placed upon correct assignment, and all personnel, with the exception of combat crews, have been interviewed prior to assignment to units to insure that insofar as operating necessity permitted they could be assigned in accordance with their most skilled military occupational specialty. Personnel combat records from higher headquarters indicate that the Wing policies on classification and assignment have been sound.

A general improvement has been noted during the course of the year in the routine administrative operations of all units of the command. The greatest improvement has been noted in the processing of Battle Casualty records.

Rest camp allotments, with few exceptions, have been utilized to the utmost by all units and have apparently been very favorably received by all personnel attached to the command. The People's Rest camp which operated at VILLADAGO during the summer months was not, in general, favorably considered and units had difficulty in filling quotas. Although very popular with personnel, it has been impossible to keep quotas for Rome filled during the winter months due to the inadequacy of transportation facilities.

During the year 1944 the 55th Bombardment Wing has seen a considerable number of personnel advances in higher grades. Advances have occurred in three major categories: (1) appointment of enlisted men to commissioned grades, (2) appointment of Flight Officers and Warrant Officers to commissioned grades, and (3) promotion of Commissioned Officers to higher grades. Advances in the first category have been fast however, it is felt that this Wing has had an equitable share of such advancement as is considered that only 1 in approximately 5,000 enlisted men receive direct appointments as commissioned officers.

With the advent of Combat appointments of Flight Officers to commissioned grades, in the early months of 1944, this headquarters made a concerted effort to insure that all worthy Flight Officers receive such appointments. As a result of this effort, the number of Flight Officers who have returned to the Zone of the Interior upon completion of a combat tour, still in the grade of Flight Officer, has been negligible.

The promotion of commissioned officers to higher grades was accelerated considerably with the advent of regulations permitting battlefield promotions. This policy was announced in the early months of 1944, and the Interior has seen many promotions in all grades up to and including the grade of Colonel.

Routine promotion of officers not qualified for battlefield promotions was given equal emphasis, and those not permitted to exhibit their abilities in actual combat were promoted rapidly as soon as it was evident that their abilities were sufficient to warrant advancement to the next higher grade. The decrease in over-all number of grade-vacancies of the Wing bears evidence of a high proportion of promotions of officers in this category.

The morale factor involved in the promotion policy during 1944 cannot be overlooked. It was undoubtedly an asset to the over-all morale situation, and consequently had a direct and beneficial effect upon the operational efficiency of the Wing.

In summarizing it can be said that the promotion policy, as it has functioned during 1944, has offered considerable opportunity for advancement of the personnel of this Wing. That it is believed that those who have been qualified and who have shown that they possess the requirements for advancement have been duly recognized. The only adverse morale factor has been that with the gradual filling of Table of Organization vacancies, many highly qualified officers and enlisted men have been penalized due to lack of position vacancy.

The recreational and diversionary activities for personnel of the 55th Bombardment Wing during the year 1944 have been extremely varied, and have satisfactorily met the needs of all enlisted and commissioned personnel. Facilities have been extremely limited, but all possible problem has been overcome by the application of ingenuity so commonly found in the American soldier.

The most popular Special Services activity has been the motion pictures. A total of 138 films have been attended by an estimated 1,110,000 soldiers from this command plus an un-estimated number from the Service Command. Nearly equal in popularity have been the USO and local army shows. This type of entertainment has varied in the extremes of seriousness and quality, but all types proved to be popular with the personnel of the Wing, and were well received and attended. A total of 19 such shows has been presented.

Other types of Special Services activities which have been quite popular are athletics, music and reading. The most popular sports have been basketball, volleyball, softball and ping-pong. Tournaments have been conducted in all major sports and records have been maintained of the part of participants as well as of non-participants. The popularity of reading is best indicated by figures of distribution of publications; Stars & Stripes-140,000; YANK-39,000; Books-17,000; Magazines-15,000.

Considerable interest has been evidenced in the Information & Education Program, and continued emphasis has been applied in an effort to satisfy these interests. In music, discussion groups, language classes, and Armed Forces Institute courses there has been a considerable number of men actively engaged throughout the year.

Units have done much for their own entertainment. Each Unit with the exception of the 464th Bombardment Group has had at least one Soldier Show and each tactical unit has procured musical instruments and supports a unit orchestra.

The main criticism in this regard has been that insufficient athletic and recreational equipment has been made available particularly musical instruments, in proportion to the requirements.

Recognition of the achievements of individuals and units alike has been a subject of primary importance throughout the year 1944. As a result of the emphasis given to this subject, this Wing stands very high in the number of awards, decorations, and citations received.

The 55th Bombardment Wing can point with particular pride to the fact that three of its four Bombardment Groups have received Presidential Distinguished Unit Citations, and the recommendation for the same award for the fourth Group is now pending. The Wing can be equally as proud of the Distinguished Service Crosses which have been awarded - one each to an Enlisted Man and an Officer. This is the second highest military award which can be received.

Of the other combat awards the Air Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross were those most frequently presented. During one month of sustained and intense operations, 767 combat crewmen were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Of the non-combat awards the Legion of Merit stands high, and seven (7) members of the Wing have been so awarded.

An innovation in awards and decorations is the 1944 authorized Bronze Star Medal. This new decoration is given for minor acts of heroism not involving flying, and for meritorious achievement in support of combat operations. Individuals heretofore unrecognized for their achievements because of non-combat assignments, are recognized by presentation of this award. The year 1944 has seen 22 individuals of the 55th Bombardment Wing presented with the Bronze Star Medal.

Commendations, both individual and unit, have been numerous, and have been given in recognition of outstanding achievement in nearly every phase of operation of the Wing.

Realizing the value of awards and decorations from the standpoint of morale, all echelons of command have given due emphasis to insure that acts of merit did not go unrecognized. Figures bear out the results of this emphasis: Combat Awards -- 18,680; Non-combat awards -- 4,411; Distinguished Unit Badges -- 14,695. Slightly over 90% of the higher awards, were presented to Enlisted Personnel, and in the lower ranking awards, Enlisted Personnel were recognized at a ratio of almost two to one over Officers.

III. INTELLIGENCE A-2

Upon arrival in the combat theater on 4 February 1944, the assigned A-2 visited and conferred with personnel of A-2, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, for orientation, and visited the A-2 Sections of the 47th, 304th and 5th Bombardment Wings to observe their functions.

Immediately following arrival at Wing headquarters in Spinazzola, the work of organizing and effecting the physical set-up of the section and Intelligence materials for this headquarters and for the assigned Bombardment Groups were received. To file, store and distribute them three S-2 clerks of the recently arrived 464th Bombardment Group were placed on Detached Service at this headquarters. The assigned A-2 worked in cooperation with Major (then Captain) MOAT, S-2, 323rd Service Group, in matters of security in Bombardment Groups.

The arrival of the Bombardment Groups required the distribution of Intelligence materials as the units were set up to receive and use them. As Teletype lines and equipment became available to the groups, the group staff officers and their clerks attempted to set up skeleton weather stations. Under the circumstances, only "canned" material could be used by Intelligence Sections at the Staff Officers to supplement the other analyses put out by higher headquarters. With those aids a weather officer and his clerk could make a fair job of briefing although the situation was far from ideal. The 464th Bombardment Group was especially unfortunate in that it was operating from a distant field at first and communications were uncertain. When the 464th joined the 465th at Pantanella the two Staff Sections combined to form a joint station. Under this arrangement, both Bombardment Groups were able to operate more effectively.

The effort of the A-2 Section has consistently been to disseminate the intelligence which is required for operations to all Command and Staff personnel concerned. In this headquarters the closest liaison and coordination with A-3 has been maintained, and the same practice insistently urged in the S-2 Sections of the Groups.

Supervision of Intelligence Sections of subordinate units was effected through inspection and frequent visits, in which mission planning, briefing, interrogation and reports procedures were observed. Intelligence training in the Bombardment Groups was closely supervised.

As all Bombardment Groups became operational the activity of the A-2 Section of the Wing necessarily increased. After some delay the War Room was equipped and furnished, and the Daily News Digest was maintained at 1115. By that time all personnel had become habituated to their duty assignments. The emphasis upon Public Relations resulted in the assignment of Captain (now Lieutenant) Joseph W. Lynch on 25 October 1944 as full time activity as Public Relations Officer. As already designated, the duties of personnel were broken down and assigned in reference to specializations. It has been a surprising feature of the work of the Section that little change in these respects has been required. The work of the section has from the beginning been done smoothly. The most considerable difficulty, from the standpoint of personnel provided by the Table of Organization, proved to be maintaining the War Room, which is customary in headquarters of higher echelon. The solution to this problem was effected when Fifteenth Air Force sent us pictorial aids, maps, and data provided by higher headquarters, and aided the Section with additional clerks were assigned. Of the many functions of the Section, that of the distribution proved to be the most difficult to master, but this was presently accomplished. The maintenance of the War Room has required a considerable amount of the time of personnel. When the facilities of rest camps became available, and personnel could take advantage of these, the tenseness obviously felt as part of combat experience noticeably lessened.

By the time that all Bombardment Groups of the Wing were fully operational (10 May 1944) the procedures which were required for the smooth and efficient function of the Section had been encountered and mastered. The Wing participated in the operations required for the Wing to participate in operations in support of the ground forces in the offensive from the Adolf Hitler to the Gothic Line in ITALY. The great offensive against Axis oil targets, "Operation FRANTIC," resulting in the landings in southern FRANCE, and communicating in the BALKANS. In these, every effort was made to insure the most modern form and content of Intelligence sources, the supply of needed target materials and the dissemination of essential Intelligence. As the tactical effectiveness of the units of the Wing became manifest in a high standard of bombing accuracy, the improvement of photography and photo interpretation was supplemented by close relation with Operations Analysis at Air Force, the consolidated Narrative Mission Reports were drawn and disseminated, and periodic strike photo interpretations. During this period, A-2, Deputy A-2 and the Photo Interpreter made visits to other Bombardment Wings to observe and compare methods and procedures for the purpose of the further improvement of the A-2 Section of this headquarters.

IV. OPERATIONS A-3

The functions of the A-3 Section have two focal points: the planning of missions and writing the Operations Orders therefor, and the supervision and training of the operations functions and personnel of the Bombardment Groups.

As to the former of these functions, it is the objective of the Operations Section to contain in the Wing Operations Orders all the direction and information required for the successful leading of a mission. Basic to this are policies of the Wing Commander. Certain of the A-3 personnel, shortly after their arrival in the combat theater, were assigned to the Combat Bombardment Groups where they early and more rapidly secured the combat experience to enable them to know at first hand the operational problems of the units of the command and thus to represent on the basis of experience that relation of the higher to the lower echelons. Other A-3 personnel flew combat missions with Bombardment Group crews. Thus the content of Operations Orders reflects not only that expertness which was attained through training in the Zone of the Interior, but familiarity and confidence gained by combat experience.

Of the Operations Orders it is to be remarked, also, that in line with the Commanding General's policy the strategic plan of the entire Fifteenth Air Force Field Order is basic, with the result that through the careful briefing which this headquarters requires the combat crews executing the mission know not only the part to be accomplished by the individual bomber of their Bombardment Group as such, but also the part of their individual Bombardment Group in relation to that of the 55th Bombardment Wing and to that of the entire striking force of the Fifteenth Air Force.

During the year 309 Operations Orders were written, which resulted in the execution of 153 missions. The content of Operations Orders has as its basis the tactical doctrine of this headquarters, a document published on 1 November 1944. The effectiveness of the tactical doctrine as a statement of it in Operations Orders is to be observed in the high achievement of tactical success attained in the Wing's operations.

In its functions of supervising the operations and the training of S-3 personnel in the Bombardment Groups, it has been the policy of this headquarters to maintain close oversight of its assigned units through regular and frequent inspections by the several Staff Section personnel, in addition to those accomplished by personnel of the Inspection Section. This policy has been the basis of the supervision of the Operations Section of the subordinate units as reflected in the sub-sections of this Report which follow.

IV A. BOMBING SUMMARY

The successful rise of the 55th Bombardment Wing to operational efficiency was made possible by the constant application of newly learned combat experience while constantly revising the basic training methods to meet fundamental accuracy. It is a generally accepted fact that while adequate fundamental bombardier training is given in the training schools, these fundamentals form only a starting point for the bombardier newly arrived in a combat zone. Many things applicable there do not fit into the ever changing combat tactics and procedures adopted by the Fifteenth Air Force. Thus, the initial problem presented to the Wing, upon its entry into operations, was the establishment of an adequate training program capable of disseminating latest combat information and procedures, and coupled with the use of synthetic training devices and air training.

The setting up of adequate training facilities for the bombardiers presented a major problem. One Bombardment Group of the Wing was forced to operate temporarily from an established Base some distance from Joint Headquarters, since the field to which this Bombardment Group was assigned was still under construction. Being stationed temporarily and expecting to move at any time discouraged a permanent bomb trainer building. With no funds available for the construction of SPAATZ huts, the Bombardment Groups established permanent bomb trainer buildings. One Group has been fortunate in their command of materials and established this on the field was utilized for a trainer building and a bombsight maintenance shop. By the end of the year each Bombardment Group had two bomb trainers in operation. Work stations for the construction of mock-ups have been built and two of the Bombardment Groups have a complete B-24 fuselage from salvaged aircraft for use in checking of replacement bombardiers.

In March of 1944, an area designated as Bombing Range Number 1 was assigned to this Headquarters. A target was built using material available on the range itself. An old rock enclosure similar to a corral was used as the center of the target. Four legs extending from the center of the square to a distance of 150 feet were built on the four cardinal headings. Whitewash was applied to this target and it proved to be sufficiently distinct above 20,000 feet.

An extensive ground training program was in operation by the end of 1944. In addition to regularly scheduled bomb trainer operations and practice tice bombing, classroom work was stressed. All new crews were indoctrinated on the operations and policies of this Wing and the Fifteenth Air Force. Discussions were regularly scheduled for target study, critiques of missions, and the dissemination of all new information pertaining to bombing.

Bomb strike photos taken on practice bombing missions are very helpful in discovering potential leaders, determining the aircraft causing poor bomb patterns, and for checking on the formation flying. Practice missions have been scheduled for all types of bombing including single aircraft and complete Bombardment Group formations. Enemy opposition, stress of combat and the lack of self confidence and crew coordination have always been contributing factors toward poor results. The lack of self confidence and crew coordination have been overcome by experience and extensive training.

The first Operations Orders were written for only one operational Bombardment Group. From these first orders it was found that the target material furnished the bombardiers was inadequate. With the establishment of a photo laboratory near the Wing Headquarters it was possible to make prints of all material pertinent to the mission in sufficient quantity so as to furnish each bombardier with a copy. As target charts would seldom give good detail of the target area, Pathfinder illustrations and photos, charts, photographs, accompanying British Aiming Point reports. Target material today is sufficient for all major targets of the Fifteenth Air Force.

The bombing accuracy of the individual Bombardment Groups improved steadily until the start of poor weather conditions. All Groups, however, did not show improvement at the same rate, but the combined average of Wing allowed steadily. During the first seven months of operations, 129 of our bombs were dropped within the desired mean point of impact and during the same period an average improvement; climbing to 50.2% for the month of September. The 55th Bombardment Wing and 465th Bombardment Group set new records during the month of August. The following is quoted from "Straight and Level" published by Operations Analysis, Fifteenth Air Force, dated 23 August 1944: The 465th Group of the 55th Wing has set a new standard for accuracy in the 15th Air Force. Last week for the previous ten missions up to and including 11 August, this Group had an average score of 66% and this week for the last ten missions up to and including August 18, 50%. "Straight and Level": "The Air Force average for four weeks of bombing crossed the 40% line for the first time and the 55th Wing has the honor of being the first Wing over 50%. This Wing was also the first to cross 40%".

It is the aim of this Wing to maintain a far-sighted training program so that the advent of bad weather and the use of new replacements cannot materially affect the over all efficiency thus far attained.

IV B. PATHFINDER OPERATIONS

The 55th Bombardment Wing was the last Wing in the Fifteenth Air Force to start Pathfinder operations. The first Pathfinder equipment arrived at the 465th Bombardment Group early in June. Operations were started with three PFF A/C and three PFF operators. All new equipment and personnel were stationed at the 465th Bombardment Group and loaned to other Groups. This was necessary because PFF maintenance was limited to that one unit. Since very little was known of Pathfinder capabilities, actual Pathfinder bombing was very limited. Early results were not good, as bombs were dropped some distance from the target by Pathfinder equipment and the majority of PFF operators were inexperienced.

In July, Pathfinder synchronous bombing was introduced. This is a system of bombing by which the Mickey Operator furnishes the Bombardier with the information necessary to drop bombs while using the bomb sight. For a period of two weeks Pathfinder operations were limited to practice flights in order to perfect this new system of bombing. On July 15 all Bombardment Groups of the 55th Wing attacked PLOESTI using PFF synchronous bombing for the first time. It was a most successful mission and it was soon seen that this method of bombing was far superior to all other types of Pathfinder bombing. The need for an intensive training program was seen and as a result the Pathfinder equipment and personnel were divided among the groups to facilitate training. During the months of August and September an extensive training program was carried out, and emphasis was placed on the training of PFF operator and bombardier teams. Due to the shortage of experienced and trained navigators arriving from the United States it was necessary to train navigators as PFF operators; this of course necessitated that the experienced operators spend a great deal of their time in training new operators.

Results of Pathfinder synchronous bombing began to improve as a result of the intensive training program. It was found that the Mickey Operator could be a valuable aid to the navigator and bombardier by giving the navigator sufficient fixes to enable him to direct a formation over a particular time compass target and to drop his bombs visually, although the target has been seen completely had it not been for the PFF. With the coming of bad weather and the enemy's use of smoke screens to hide profitable targets, PFF operations continued to increase. It was found that the Mickey Operator could, if necessary, navigate a formation to the target, drop the bombs, and navigate to the base. Much use was made of PFF equipment to avoid flak areas and to penetrate bad weather. Pathfinder A/C were dispatched as single planes and dropped bombs with fair success on both day and night operations. During the month of December most of the 55th Bombardment Wing's operations were at least partially dependent on Pathfinder. Results of several missions on which Pathfinder synchronous bombing was employed show that there has been a great improvement in PFF bombing. Much of the success of PFF operations has been due to the fine work of the maintenance personnel and it is expected that there will be even greater improvement in the next few months.

IV C. TRAINING

The combat training of the units of this Wing began many months before their arrival overseas. The culmination of this training came when each Bombardment Group was sent to OUJDA, North Africa for final training steps where their crews were instructed on the latest combat procedures. After a few weeks at OUJDA the units were brought to ITALY, where an extensive training program was established; designed to concentrate on deficiencies of combat training that were discovered in AFRICA.

On 19 March 1944, the 464th Bombardment Group flew the first operational mission of the Wing by attacking an ANCONA M/Y. This was the first in the series of so called "freshmen" missions. Each Bombardment Group flew approximately 5 of these freshmen missions before making deep penetration to heavily defended targets.

As the Bombardment Groups became settled, and improved conditions on their bases, the training program went into full swing. Training committees were established. Bomb and Link Trainers were set up in each unit; targets were taken from wrecked airplanes and used to establish dummy compass. These synthetic training devices operating in the Bombardment Groups included Link Jam Trainers, Gee Trainers, PFF Trainers, and Code Practice Sets. A B-24 mobile trainer was set up in Wing Headquarters to practice different bombing procedures.

Critiques were held at Wing Headquarters under the direction of the Commanding General. These were valuable in finding tactical errors and problems encountered with each combat mission and means were discussed of overcoming them. These critiques proved to be highly successful.

As the Wing grew older and its record of combat missions increased, crews finished their tour of duty and returned to the United States. Replacement crews, who had been arriving in a steady stream, now came in large numbers, and the indoctrination program was enlarged to accommodate them. These new crews did not have to learn as they fought, but were thoroughly instructed by the older crews.

Profiting by earlier mistakes, the training program was revised and expanded. Training Officers were appointed in each Bombardment Group. They coordinated the training program with the Group Operations and Intelligence Officers. A tactical Doctrine was published to give all crew members a concise and complete picture of what the Wing was trying to accomplish.

The success of this training program can be judged by the fact that this Wing has an enviable record over a course of over 150 combat missions. During the period of 19 May thru 3l May 1944 it topped all units of the Air Force in Bombing Accuracy. From 7 May through 31 October 1944, this Wing maintained second place in bombing accuracy.

Since training operations began in March 1944, this wing has flown 14,931 training sorties for a total of 30,442 serial training hours and dropped 15,000 practice bombs.

IV D. GUNNERY

In April, 1943, when the 55th Bombardment Wing was activated in the United States, under the Third Air Force, it operated as an OTU and RTU unit. All Groups assigned to the Wing were equipped with adequate facilities for training aerial gunners. The Air Force supplied what equipment was available. Such as was not available was devised and constructed locally.

Notwithstanding the fact that a large percentage of the personnel assigned were graduates of Gunnery School, it was decided to give each man a complete course in gunnery. Instructions covered the use of Jam Handy trainers, turrets for operation, miniature airplanes for tracking, a complete check-out on all turrets and sights, and included the identification of aircraft, detail stripping of 50 calibre machine guns blindfolded, skeet shooting, and the use of equipment built by the Wing.

The 55th Bombardment Wing was the first unit to use shotguns with flexible mounts and shotguns mounted on turrets, in place of 50 calibre machine guns, to shoot clay pigeons, thus giving the gunner a visual result of his tracking and shooting. This was the idea of Col. A. J. Meyers, Commanding Officer of the 95th Bombardment Group, and was personally supervised and put into practice by the Wing Commander. This phase of training gave many a young combat crew member the confidence that he could become an aerial gunner.

The 55th Bombardment Wing was the first to use a 50-foot tower to throw targets out for the gunners to shoot at. This and many other of the ideas which the Wing developed were later adopted by the Flying Training Command and installed in the different gunnery schools as standard training.

When the Wing Headquarters arrived in the Mediterranean theater early in February, 1944, it was impossible to procure such training devices as these, or the materials to construct them. This condition was only one of the many problems which had to be solved in the establishment of an adequate gunnery program.

One of the problems of prime importance was that of selecting, as rapidly as Bombardment Groups arrived from the United States, an Officer for each Bombardment Group. It was apparent that in sending Officers to Gunnery School in the United States, an uphill pull, and Officer leadership was required.

Fortunately, the observations of the Wing Commander on his combat missions in ITALY had given him a basis for the gunnery training program.

He reasoned that no gunner could cover 360 degrees of territory. Since nothing along the idea of "search" was taught in gunnery schools in the United States, the Wing Commander inaugurated a plan by which each gunner in the aircraft was assigned a definite area to watch, depending upon his position in the bomber and in the formation, a function which would be performed against a "sneak attack" by enemy fighters. With the aid of a draftsman, this idea was sketched and the formation of miniature airplanes with the area assigned each gunner marked in red. The Wing Commander and the General Staff submitted the idea and sketches to Plans and Training, Fifteenth Air Force. The idea was approved, detailed drawings made and were prepared, and it was decided to call the system "Automatic Search and Fire Control." One of the first phases of gunnery training in our Groups then began with lectures, and charts, on "A. S. F. C."

The idea and charts were dispatched to the United States and the system is now used by Gunnery Schools in their training program.

During the first few months of operations, Bombardment Group Gunnery Officers were busy lecturing on A. S. F. C., position firing, and checking in replacements as they arrived from the United States. Several courses were set up at Bombardment Group level to further training of Communications personnel with the Communications Officers of the groups and learn proper use. Radio Operators, Switchboard Operators, Wire Chiefs, and Cryptographic Clerks are being carried out regularly.

With the amount of traffic clearing thru the Wing's Code Room, it became evident that four code clerks and one Officer of the Signal Company Wing were not sufficient, and arrangements were made at each Bombardment Group arrived to have them send in men to man their code room staff. In August 1944 another Officer was added, thereby permitting operation of the code room 24 hours daily. Each Bombardment Group has been given assistance in setting up its code rooms and in training its personnel.

"Neither snow nor rain nor dark of night shall keep these couriers from their appointed task" is the slogan of the Postal Service in the United States, and it is very appropriate for the couriers who run the several routes operated by the Signal Company. Due to road conditions and the terrain over which they operate is very hilly and many roads are of poor construction. The schedule is maintained regardless of the weather. In addition to the regular run special couriers are always available day and night.

August 1944 was the month chosen to start a program of winterizing all of the telephone shelters, a survey was made of all the installations of the Bombardment Groups and the wire lines to headquarters. Material was requisitioned and the work started. This involved the moving of switchboards and teletype machines from under canvas to more permanent buildings, and tuff block buildings were set up where required. All field wire that showed signs of deterioration was replaced and cable laid where possible. Two methods were used to protect the wire and cable from damage. One was to build a pole line of lance poles and fasten the wire thereon and the other method was to bury the wire and cable underground. This program was in such advanced condition that by the time the bad weather arrives by reducing the number of trouble incidents caused by wire and cable failures.

The Wing Headquarters was established only a short time when the Bombardment Groups assigned to the Wing began to arrive. In March 1944, the 464th Bombardment Group was set up shortly after the Wing Headquarters arrived at that date. Each Bombardment Group was confronted with the problem of setting up two fields, one at Gioia and the other at Pantanella. This meant establishing communications between both fields and an excellent job was done, considering all of the handicaps that were encountered.

465th Bombardment Group arrived in March and the 465th Bombardment Group in April of 1944. Trunk lines and cut-ins to the offices had to be established and it required only the setting up of the lines on each unit's switchboard and running in the local systems to establish telephone communications to headquarters.

All of our Bombardment Groups were faced with the same problems: lack of equipment, shelter and lighting facilities, the maintenance of inadequate radio equipment and lines in an area in the process of construction, runways, and buildings to house the various sections. The Communications Officers spent a considerable amount of their time in installing lighting systems, and in setting up communications facilities at each field.

Navigational aids, an element of Communications, entered into the picture when operational missions were started. The 464th Bombardment Group operates a Radio Range (SCR-277) for this area and the 465th and 485th Bombardment Groups have a Radio Beacon at their respective fields, the 464th Group utilizing the same field as the 465th Bombardment Group. Both of these beacons were constructed of material and equipment on hand. The automatic keyer for these beacons consists of a battery powered device which was cut in such a manner that the rotations of the beacon are sent out. The approximate range of these beacons is 250 miles and they prove very helpful to fliers during inclement weather.

Training is an important part of the Communications Officer's duties, and all the Communications Officers of this Wing have worked hard in setting up classrooms, cook tables and mockups of the aircraft radios in order to train with the equipment the men will use in flight. It is a continous program in the Bombardment Groups, not only to improve performance but to train replacements who are always coming in.

At the close of the year plans were in the making to provide voice communications with Fifteenth Air Force even though all other facilities should fail. This new equipment is known as AN/TRC-1, a frequency modulation radio with three voice channels and four teletype circuits simultaneously. The installation of this system has been installed and tested and as more of this equipment becomes available in the future it will be used to form similar nets between the Bombardment Groups and the Wing.

The following figures show only the amount of traffic sent over the various communication nets and does not show the time spent by the communications personnel within the Wing in maintaining the equipment would continue to function at its peak under all conditions.

The experience gained by all Signal and Communications personnel in operating the Wing's systems will prove advantageous to any future operation in any theatre.

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC 10 March to 31 Dec 1944 Daily Average 473,057 calls 1363.5 calls TELETYPE TRAFFIC 10 March to 31 Dec 1944 Total Bombardment Groups 37,161 messages 1,903,410

RADIO TRAFFIC Point-to-Point Net 10 February to 31 Dec 1944 990 messages Total Bombardment Groups 65,400

Air-Ground Liaison Net 20 April to 31 Dec 1944 1560 messages

MESSAGE CENTER 12 February to 31 Dec 1944 26,400 messages

COURIERS 20 April to 31 Dec 1944 94,000 miles covered. No statistics of special courier service

CODE ROOM 12 February to 15 Dec 1944 5,969 messages Total Bombardment Group Count 1,261,856

ELECTRICAL POWER Power load varies from 10 to 17 kilowatts, and is distributed as follows: Communication 4 kilowatts Wire lighting 4 - 7 kilowatts Miscellaneous 2 - 6 kilowatts

e. In PF aircraft only.

f. Original installation of AN/APT-2 made in July.

g. Original installation of AN/APT-2 made in November.

h. Original installation of AN/VF-3 made in December.

i. Original installation of AN/APQ-5 made in December.

j. Original installation made in July.

k. Original installation made in December.

Pathfinder

The first Pathfinder (PF) aircraft arrived in the 55th Bombardment Wing, 465th Bombardment Group, on 20 May '44. Two officers and 10 enlisted men, trained in PF maintenance but with limited experience in maintaining this equipment in the field, were received from Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force and put on DS with this headquarters to form a nucleus for further expansion within the Wing. These men had been assigned to the 484th Bombardment Group, 49th Bombardment Wing, because it was the only unit in the Fifteenth Air Force with a Table of Organization covering radar personnel. Each new Pathfinder plane arriving in this Wing before September brought two additional radar mechanics (867) who were assigned to the 484th Bombardment Group and put on DS at this headquarters. These men were assigned to the respective units of the Wing about 20 September under T/O and E 1-112, dated 21 Sep 44.

The first PF mission was flown over PLOESTI on 6 June. By the end of the year over 750 operational PF sorties had been flown as shown on the following summary of PF operations.

[TABLE FORMAT] Number No. Missions Operational No. PF Opr'l Prac- Hrs Prac- PF PFF Used PF Sorties Failures tice tice Op- Planes PF eration Hours, sorties June 8 10 28 7 108 15 18 July 21 10 75 13 330 59 77 August 17 16 121 17 500 136 231 September 14 13 68 3 330 95 183 October 21 11 71 5 355 93 158 November 21 15 175 21 529 117 188 December 52 20 246 30 1162 89 180 Total 95 764 96 3714 605 1035

VIII A. RADAR ACTIVITIES

The installation of radar equipment in planes of the 55th Wing has been the most important new development, as far as communications and operations are concerned, since arriving overseas. The addition of new combat radar equipment, classified in character, that required new personnel, new maintenance facilities, and different operational procedures, has created many problems.

The radar program of this Wing has involved the addition of about 120 radar mechanics, 6 radar maintenance officers, and about 40 "Mickey" operators. Two models of AN/APQ-13, 822, two radar altimeters (SCR-718 and AN/APN-1), two Carpet Jammers (AN/APT-2 and AN/APQ-5), a radar monitoring receiver (AN/APR-1), and a Spot-Jammer are the different types of radar equipment added to the Wing since its arrival overseas.

The following is a chart showing the radar equipment installed in aircraft in the 55th Wing by the end of 1944:

[TABLE FORMAT] Radar Equipment in 55th Wing

Bombardment Radar No Radar Radar Spot Group Pathfinder Altimeter ECM Carp- Recv'er Jam PFF SCR-718 AN/APN-1 et AN/ per APQ-5 APR-1 a 460th 14 14 34 18 *30 $*1 &*1 14 b 464th 12 12 39 17 @*31 12 c 465th 13 12 38 16 #*26 13 d 485th 13 13 32 21 £*38 13 Total 52 51 143 72 125 1 1 52

• Explanation:

a. Began separate PF maintenance for 460th and 485th Bombardment Groups on 12 Jul 44.

b. Began separate PF maintenance on 16 Nov 44.

c. Maintained Pathfinder for all Bombardment Groups until 12 Jul and for 464th until 15 Nov 44.

d. Began separate PF maintenance on 10 Sep 44.

The introduction of synchronous bombing, an almost steady influx of new PF operators, and later the necessity of training navigators from the Groups to operate H2X made numerous practice flights imperative. More than 600 practice sorties with over 1000 H2X hours were flown during the year.

The most critical problem in maintaining Pathfinder at first was the lack of auxiliary power units (an ground-checking equipment) at Wing. Planes arriving with Andover H2X power units installed, that could be used in ground-check H2X, later solved the power problem. With the increase in number of PF planes, power is once more becoming an acute problem.

Transportation has been critical in all groups from the start and promises to become more critical with the further increase in H2X and PF equipment.

The problem of flying planes from one field to another field in PF maintenance was very serious until a radar maintenance shop was installed at each field. In November, the 464th Bombardment Group Radar Shop began to maintain the PF equipment for their group. This made two PF maintenance shops on Pantanella field which housed two Bombardment Groups, but it greatly simplified maintenance problems since the number of planes had increased beyond the capabilities of one shop.

The maintenance personnel were, almost without exception, inexperienced in line maintenance of radar equipment before their arrival at technical schools. A great deal of credit is due them for their ability to make Pathfinder as effective as it has become. The same situation existed with "Mickey" Navigators. Navigators just out of school arrived here with inadequate training, in many cases at first, and were put in lead ships of Group and Wing formations. Great credit is due the navigators for their diligence and perseverance. Constant training and practice combined with operational experience made Pathfinder more effective.

Sufficient numbers of PF aircraft to allow the optimum number to be used on missions were not available until November. From July until September the number actually decreased because no replacement aircraft equipped with H2X were received.

Supplies for H2X were never plentiful after operations were started. Most critical for the first three months was necessary test equipment, including oscilloscopes and Cathode ray oscilloscopes. Later, replacement parts for inventory became most critical, followed closely by 715 and 723 vacuum tubes. Additional base spares are needed as well as spare units.

Numerous modifications were made on the H2X equipment to adapt it for synchronous bombing and make it most effective for our purposes. The extra parts necessary to do this further decreased our limited supplies, not to mention the very large number of man-hours involved.

Added complications have resulted from a new model H2X set (AN/APQ-13*4) in all planes arriving in December. These units are not interchangeable with those of AN/APQ-13. A new type computer that cannot be used with our standard synchronous procedures is a part of this new set. This created still more maintenance problems.

The failure of equipment used to pressurize units of the H2X set resulted in H2X failures on several missions. The pressure pump installed in the first planes was not at all dependable. Therefore, the planes was modified so as to use pressure from the de-icer system for the H2X equipment.

With night and PFF missions planned, the de-icer system is again used to inflate and deflate the boots on the wings and stabilizers. This made still another modification necessary in order to continue the use of de-icer pressure for H2X. Fortune smiled and now dependable pressure pumps arrived before many planes had to be modified in the new way.

The value of PF scope pictures for target material was recognized when operations began. A camera installation was tried in July and August but proved to be unreliable. A different type of camera installation was tried in November. These modifications were made when scope pictures of targets began coming of the problems were solved. Pictures of targets should be obtained regularly from the two cameras available in each Bombardment Group.

In November, a supersonic H2X trainer was installed at the 465th Bombardment Group. This allows simulation of actual air operation and is extremely important in training new navigators on proper operating procedure.

GEE

GEE sets were installed in four planes of each Bombardment Group in May, and a few GEE mechanics arrived to maintain them. A trainer was set up in Wing Headquarters to train navigators to operate the equipment. About the first of August trainers were set up in each Bombardment Group. Since then, training has been a part of the indoctrination program for all navigators. When they first arrive in the unit. The limiting factor in the GEE program has been the small number of installations in each unit due to unavailability of equipment.

RADAR COUNTER-MEASURES Chaff

As a Radar Counter-Measure, Chaff has become a standard procedure. In the use of this material a major problem early occurred, as the chaff became scattered throughout the interior of the aircraft and became tangled in the electrical wiring. Chaff dispensing chutes on all planes has been the solution.

Carpet

AN/APT-2 transmitters with A-23-a dipole antennas were installed in the 460th and 464th Bombardment Groups as part of the original Carpet installation. AN/APT-5 transmitters with A-29/APT-5 fishbook antennas were installed in the 465th and 485th Bombardment Groups in December. The AN/APQ-5, being a higher powered unit with a better antenna, seemed very effective in the few missions that it was used. All replacements in the future will be equipped with AN/APQ-5. Later, two sets will be installed in each plane.

A very poorly designed antenna connector has been the chief cause of trouble with all types of Carpet.

The one Spot-Jammer at the 464th Bombardment Group was used on only a few missions. No definite conclusions can be made. Installation of ten Spot-Jammers per Group, in the near future, is contemplated.

An AN/APR-1 radar monitoring receiver was installed in a plane in the 464th Bombardment Group in July. Forty-five monitoring missions were flown over enemy territory by one officer and four enlisted observers, logging all enemy radar frequencies intercepted. These data have been consolidated at Fifteenth Air Force with that obtained by other Wings and used to determine the frequency bands to be covered by Carpet.

IFF

All planes arrived in this theatre equipped with IFF as their form of radar. IFF mechanics were included in the communications sections. IFF was removed from all aircraft early in the summer, since all missions were flown by large formations in good weather.

In December, IFF was re-installed in all Pathfinder and other planes that were to be flown at night.

When IFF was removed, the personnel were trained by the Bombardment Groups, or by schools conducted by Fifteenth Air Force Service Command, to maintain other radar equipment, or were used to supplement the Communications Sections.

RADAR ALTIMETERS

The SCR-718 is a 40,000 foot altimeter installed in PF planes only. The AN/APN-1, a 400 and 4000 foot altimeter, has been a standard piece of equipment in all replacement aircraft for several months.

In addition to the lack of unavailable parts the greatest maintenance problem for these altimeters has been the breaking of the AN/APN-1 antennas under the catwalk of the bomb-bay on B-24 Pathfinder planes. This problem has not been overcome.

The 465th Bombardment Group has been unable to get necessary test equipment for these altimeters as yet, though it has been on requisition since July.

GYRO FLUX GATE COMPASS

While the Gyro Flux Gate Compass is not a part of radar, it is used in conjunction with the H2X equipment. Lack of trained personnel to calibrate and maintain this equipment continues to be a very serious problem.

IX. MEDICAL

HEALTH OF THE COMMAND

The general health of the 55th Bombardment Wing during 1944 may be considered to have been very good. Except for the month of May, when this organization was second in the Fifteenth Air Force for total disease, this Wing has been the lowest or one of the lowest in this Air Force. Only in enteric or intestinal diseases were we consistently above the other Wings and this unavoidable position occurs while we were still building quarters, mess halls, and dish-washing facilities. We have had no epidemics, such as sand fly fever, infectious hepatitis (Jaundice), or malaria, and few incidents of venereal disease. The peak of venereal disease in this Wing was 109. The relative standing of the 55th Bombardment Wing, in relation to the six Wings of the Fifteenth Air Force in number of cases causing non-effectiveness of personnel, dropped from one of the highest down to the lowest.

VENEREAL DISEASE

The incidence of venereal disease in the Wing during the first six months. During the months of May through August, 1944, the number of cases of venereal disease increased, to a summer peak. These units had the highest incidence. September through November showed a gratifying drop below the Air Force level. One might hazard a guess on the reasons for this reversal and say that during the spring and summer most of the personnel were fresh from the States. They were "unorganized" and unacquainted with legalized prostitution. Many took advantage of this new slant on life and were "burned". The last three months showed a gain in understanding by personnel of disease. With "burning" and perhaps colder weather and poorer roads were deterrent factors. The Bombardment Groups seemed to alternate in taking the lead and no one unit held the spotlight for longer than one month. It could probably be added that as each Bombardment Group reached the top, it was subjected to an extensive barrage of VD films and lectures, which, it is believed, lowered the incidence of venereal disease.

RESPIRATORY DISEASES

During May this Wing was second in the Fifteenth Air Force in the incidence of upper respiratory infections, while in June it had fallen to fifth place. This can be attributed to a mild epidemic of Nasopharyngitis in the 464th Bombardment Group during May with a rate of 309.8 per 1000 per annum. This rate dropped to 41.0 per 1000 per annum in June. The underlying cause was probably the lack of proper sleeping and housing facilities when we first arrived in this theater. Many of the ground crew personnel were obliged to sleep on the damp ground until adequate lumber and tuff block could be obtained for the construction of beds and dwellings. During the month of August the 485th Bombardment Group had a slight epidemic, which pushed it to a new rate of 92.0 per 1000 per annum up to 150.0 per annum. No attempt will be made to suggest the probable cause of this explosive outbreak. With the coming of winter there has been a gradual increase in the incidence of upper respiratory infections in the command, but by the end of the year units had become fairly well winterized and incidence remains below the Fifteenth Air Force level.

INTESTINAL DISEASE

The 55th Bombardment Wing has the poorest record in the Fifteenth Air Force in the number of cases hospitalized because of intestinal diseases. Why it remained above the level of other Wings is not readily understood, but the reasons for the high incidence within the Wing are painfully clear. Poor sanitation and a myriad of flies during the spring and summer months were responsible for the majority of the cases. Lack of proper screening in the earlier months, inadequate mess kit washing facilities, poorly inspected Italian KP's, and construction of the existing camps. The 464th Bombardment Group arrived in this theater sooner than most units and was able to construct better homes, better washing facilities, and it led in the screening of kitchens, mess halls, and latrines. Its incidence of intestinal diseases was far below the other three Bombardment Groups. The unsatisfactory sanitary conditions at GIOIA were clearly revealed in the manner in which the 464th Bombardment Group led the Wing in incidence of intestinal diseases during April. The high incidence of diarrhea in this group in July is attributed to improper screening of mess halls and latrine by flies in the fly population. The 465th Bombardment Group remained fairly low in incidence except for one epidemic in July due to contaminated ice cream. There was a considerable drop in September, when better sanitary conditions prevailed and a seasonal drop in the number of flies occurred. With the advent of cold autumn weather intestinal diseases assumed a minor role in the health of the command. Since few flies are now present to act as vectors of disease, most cases of diarrhea during the winter season can probably be attributed to fecal contamination of the food by unwashed hands, by either American or Italian personnel.

MALARIA

Malaria and other insect borne diseases, such as sand fly fever, never became a major problem in this Wing. Case histories on malaria patients usually revealed a break in malaria discipline, while visiting other and more malarious areas in ITALY. Through a rigid control program, the anopheline mosquito was kept fairly well in check and very few cases of malaria, the population took a suppressive dose of Atabrine daily it is quite possible that additional cases of malaria may occur during January and February. This will occur when the blood level of atabrine no longer keeps the parasites from multiplying.

INFECTIOUS HEPATITIS (Jaundice)

The 55th Bombardment Wing has been among the lowest in the Fifteenth Air Force in its incidence of infectious hepatitis. This little understood malady has never reached epidemic proportions in this command, but every month shows at least two or three admissions to the hospital because of this disease. Since most cases of infectious hepatitis come down with this disease soon after frequent attacks of diarrhea or gastro-enteritides, some three or four months prior to the onset of jaundice or other symptoms, additional stress has been placed on the Wing sanitation problems. Italian kitchen help have been supervised more closely and an attempt made to eliminate their handling of food. By the end of the year, this single disease has contributed more to non-effectiveness of personnel in this Air Force than any other illness, largely due to the prolonged disability of each case. The last quarter has certainly and new pointing to the fact that through a continued vigilance of mess and latrine sanitation we can avoid having an epidemic in this command.

INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASE APRIL - DECEMBER, 1944

[CHART: A line graph showing venereal disease rates for different bombardment groups (460th, 464th, 465th, 485th) from April through December 1944. The y-axis shows rates per 1000 per annum from 0 to 115, and lines track each group's rates over time.]

X. A. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION

The Headquarters of this Wing was activated and organized primarily for O.T.U. and R.T.U. training in the Third Air Force. By the processing methods and primary organization of the Bombardment Groups and units, a considerable knowledge and experience in administrative procedures and inspection was acquired before this Wing was ordered overseas.

Forearmed with this knowledge and experience, an initial survey of all Groups was made to determine their status from an administrative point of view. It was found that procedures and records were in an unsatisfactory condition because of the following factors:

1. The Air Force activating the Bombardment Groups assigned to us did not integrate and/or indoctrinate standard methods and procedures within these units.
2. Commissioned personnel in general, and enlisted men in particular, did not have adequate knowledge of general administration; in some instances they were using wrong methods without knowledge of pertinent directives.
3. P.O.M. inspection before departure of organizations from the Zone of the Interior overlooked a considerable amount of discrepancies which existed and lay dormant in all types of records.
4. Organizations were not fully equipped with the necessary file of Army Regulations and other standard directives needed in administrative procedures.

Having determined the administrative status of the Bombardment Groups, formal inspections were commenced on the second week of April, beginning with the 464th Bombardment Group. In addition to the formal inspection, a series of lectures was given on the following subjects:

1. Coordination of paper work between Squadrons and Group Headquarters.
2. Organization of orderly rooms into distinct Command and Personnel sections.
3. Uniform rendition of reports, forms, and correspondence.
4. Uniform maintenance and remarks in pay rolls, morning reports, sick reports, service records and funds.
5. Economical and standardized mess management.
6. Uniform maintenance of Quartermaster Supply and all other pertinent records.

Major problems of Administrative Inspection were:

1. The education of administrative personnel.
2. Inability to obtain current War Department and other directives, and necessary War Department forms in quantity required for normal operation.

Organized administrative inspections within the Bombardment Groups were not accomplished for several months. Unit inspections were conducted by Staff Officers as time allowed them. Since the authorization of Air Inspectors by the current T/O in each Bombardment Group, administrative inspections have gained considerable momentum by the assignment of Air and/or Administrative Inspectors on a full time basis.

A total of twenty (20) formal inspections were made during the year 1944, in addition to numerous informal visits in an advisory capacity. In April the general rating of the subordinate commands ranged from unsatisfactory to satisfactory; by the end of the year they were rated excellent in entirety.

X. B. TECHNICAL INSPECTION

Upon arrival at our Wing headquarters the Technical Inspection Department, under the supervision of the Air Inspector, was set up for operation with the latest possible date. Informal meetings with the Wing Commander and Technical Inspection Personnel realize further the importance of their assignment and the major problems which were ahead.

After completing the first Group Technical Inspection, a meeting was arranged with the Fifteenth Air Force Air Inspector for the purpose of acquiring knowledge of Air Force Inspection policies.

Continued Technical Inspections revealed that the major problem confronting the lower echelons of command was lack of inspection consciousness. Further, numerous early operational problems had necessitated the assignment of other duties to Technical Inspection personnel. The correction of these irregularities was secured by Wing Technical Inspection. Command Officers concerned ascertained the maintenance status of Technical Inspection Departments and equipment, after which Technical Inspection activities showed a rapid improvement.

The adopted policy of the Wing Technical Inspectors, under the supervision of Wing Air Inspector, has been to conduct instructive and constructive inspections, adhering to AAF Regulations and Technical Publications insofar as current operating conditions and facilities would permit.

During the course of the year's activities, the Technical Inspectors of the Air Inspector's Section have completed a total of twenty-five (25) formal inspections. The tactical Groups have set up excellent Technical Inspection systems composed of qualified personnel who are conducting inspections in accordance with the policies of the Wing Commander and current directives.

XI. MILITARY JUSTICE

During the year 1944, a total of 771 arrests were made and 986 charges were preferred against personnel of this command. The nature of the charges were primarily concentrated in four principal categories, namely; off limits, no pass, failure to obey orders, failure to wear identification tags. The trend of the charges fluctuated both upward and downward during the initial months of operations, reaching a peak during the month of August, when 133 arrests were made and 156 charges preferred. Delinquencies during September were dormant in all bombardment groups, with the exception of the 460th Bombardment Group. The peak month of the command was reached during October when three fewer arrests were made than during August, but 183 charges were preferred. A heartening decrease took place in November, resulting in only 58 arrests and 93 charges. The 464th Bombardment Group dropped off sharply. With the exception of the 464th Bombardment Group, the trend of delinquencies continues downward through November and it is of note to point out that the number of charges preferred against personnel of the 465th Bombardment Group decreased 62% over their October average and in the 485th Bombardment Group the number of charges decreased from 47 in October to 9 in December, a decrease of over 88%. An analysis by unit showing the number of arrests and charges and the rate per 100 men is as follows:

DELINQUENCY CHARGES AND ARRESTS

                    Total   Rate per   Total   Rate per

                  Arrests  100 men   Charges  100 men

460th Bombardment Group 225 10.6 275 13.0 464th Bombardment Group 194 9.1 246 11.6 465th Bombardment Group 186 8.7 249 11.1 485th Bombardment Group 166 7.9 216 10.3 Wing Average 771 9.1 986 11.6

18 cases were initiated in which general courts-martial proceedings were held, 63 special courts-martial trials and 234 summary courts-martial trials. An analysis by Groups, showing the rate per 1000 men is as follows:

                     General        Special         Summary

                  Courts-Martial  Courts-Martial  Courts-Martial

460th Bombardment Group 3.8 8.1 26.0 464th Bombardment Group 1.4 9.8 30.4 465th Bombardment Group 2.3 6.1 30.4 485th Bombardment Group 2.4 5.7 23.0 Wing Average 2.1 7.4 28.0

XII. CHAPLAIN

Through nine months, religious work has had great growth in this Wing.

From a small attendance --- and inadequate facilities --- in the beginning, we now have two temporary chapels; one in the 485th Bombardment Group; one in the 464th Bombardment Group. Theatres are used in the other Groups for religious services.

Every chaplain reports excellent co-operation on the part of administrative officers in his group.

There are four Protestant chaplains and two Catholic chaplains conducting all the services for the Wing and the subordinate units.

The chaplains have done and are doing excellent work. Their co-operation with the Wing chaplain leaves nothing to be desired.

The attendance and religious worship is remarkable in all Groups. The chapel at the 485th Bombardment Group is no longer ample to accommodate the numbers with one Catholic service, so two Masses must be said there on Sundays.

The Wing chaplain services the 485th Bombardment Group and the 460th Bombardment Group twice a week; the 342nd Signal Company Wing once a week, the 323rd Service Group and 55th Bombardment Wing once a week, and the 1st Platoon 34th Field Hospital once a week.

A total of 257 services were held in 1944. These were attended by an excess of 21,000 members of this command. 204 interviews were held and over 400 visits were made to personnel in the field. Other activities included writing 264 letters to soldiers' families, and the distribution of 150 religious articles and over 700 pieces of literature.

XIII. PUBLIC RELATIONS

Results of Public Relations activities can be judged by the volume of production, the percentage of production published, and the effect of the effort on public opinion.

A comparatively small part of the total news copy produced, but the most vital, has been the immediate coverage by Public Relations of combat operations. Mission sidelights and comments by crew members are consolidated at Wing Headquarters and teletyped to Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, where they are incorporated in official news releases available to world press and radio.

By far the greatest part of the copy produced has been the mail copy (promotions, decorations, citations and features).

In this category, the Public Relations Sections of Wing has produced 19,356 news releases, monthly production climbing from 214 stories in April to a high of 3,300 in October. Since July, this Wing has been consistently among the highest in the Fifteenth Air Force in the monthly production of Public Relations releases.

Every combat operation is covered photographically, and newsworthy pictures are transmitted by the most expeditious means, through channels to MAAF, where the best pictures are radio-photoed to the United States. The following table is a record of news releases and negatives, other than combat photographs, released for publication:

                            News      

                          Releases    Negatives

460th Bombardment Group 2799 670 464th Bombardment Group 5423 382 465th Bombardment Group 4168 640 485th Bombardment Group 4120 590 Wing Headquarters 876 319 Total 19356 2601

In October, the Public Relations Sections of the Wing began using radio as an additional means of dissemination. Programs featuring personnel from the various units of the Wing have been transcribed at Rome where Headquarters MAAF, the facilities for making transcriptions of interviews, which are released to radio stations in the United States.

Through personal contact with "Stars and Stripes", "Yank" and civilian correspondents, Public Relations has been of direct service to important media.

Since there is no way to check on every picture or news story released it is necessary to estimate the volume of material published. On the basis of the ten clippings returned, which is a value as to releases per thousand or more column inches of news about its personnel, or enough to fill a typical, standard-sized page daily newspaper for about six months.

The photographs and stories published became a part of the mass of information being furnished the people at home from the combat zones, so that it is difficult to detect the particular effect of releases submitted by this headquarters. Such editorial comment as has been noted on incidents reported by Public Relations in this Wing has been favorable. Occasional letters from editors, former employers, college alumni secretaries and various civilians who have been impressed by particular stories have been received. These unsolicited, together with anecdotes and comments from soldiers who receive word about items which have appeared in their hometown newspapers, prove that the photographs and stories released are contributing decisively to the maintenance of the kind of public confidence which is essential to victory.

Until the Wing began full-scale combat operations, it had no full-time Public Relations personnel, the Table of Organization of both the Groups and Wing Headquarters providing for only part time activity in that field.

The gradual assignment of full-time personnel created another problem arising from the lack of trained newspapermen, a weakness which added to the tasks of organization, expansion and production the elementary task of training. Basically, all these problems have been solved, although there will be no time when it will be admitted that the opportunities for improvement are ended.

XIV. STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. STRIKING FORCE

During the period of approximately nine months in which the 55th Bombardment Wing carried on operations in 1944, a total of 16,978 aircraft were dispatched, and 13,250 aircraft succeeded in dropping their bombs. The peak of effectiveness of our sorties was achieved during the month of August when 86.6% of aircraft dispatched succeeded in dropping their bombs. The onset of unfavorable weather, beginning in late September, hampered our ability to drop our bombs and during October, our effective sortie rate was 69%, increasing to 73% in November, and dropping off slightly in December. The following tabulation shows the number of aircraft dispatched, number of aircraft bombing, the effective sortie rate, and tonnage dropped:

                      Number     Number   Percentage

                     Aircraft   Aircraft   Sorties

                    Dispatched   Bombing  Effective  Tonnage

460th Bombardment Group 4705 3723 79% 8373 464th Bombardment Group 4144 3124 76% 7125 465th Bombardment Group 4140 3215 78% 7214 485th Bombardment Group 3989 3196 79% 7220 Wing Total 16978 13258 78% 29932

2028 of the aircraft dispatched failed to reach enemy lines, of which 907 returned because of unfavorable weather enroute to the target. Excluding the weather factor, our rate of early returns for the Wing was 6.6%. 1720 aircraft penetrated into enemy territory but failed to bomb, 760 being unable to do so because of unfavorable weather over the target area, and the resulting adverse effect on our effective sortie rate for the Wing was 5.6%. The following table shows the number of early returns and non-effective sorties, the number attributable to weather and the resultant rate per 100 aircraft dispatched:

                     Early     Abortives/  Rate per 100

                   Returns  Effective   due to  Early  Non-Effective

                             Sorties   Total  Weather Returns   Sorties

460th Bombardment Group 350 430 980 389 7.5 5.1 464th Bombardment Group 532 458 990 430 6.5 6.9 465th Bombardment Group 570 355 925 482 7.1 3.6 485th Bombardment Group 576 477 863 366 7.1 5.8 Wing Total 2028 1720 3748 1667 6.6 5.5

Reasons for early returns and non-effective sorties are shown on the succeeding page. Mechanical failures accounted for 1011 abortives, 27% of the total, primarily attributable to engine and supercharger failures. Aircraft and accessory failures accounted for 10% and miscellaneous factors for 18%. Weather was responsible for 45% of our abortives for the period.

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) EARLY RETURNS AND NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES 19 MARCH - 31 DECEMBER 1944

CAUSE NUMBER % RATE PER 100 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE MECHANICAL FAILURE Engine 373 Supercharger 255 Oil leak 100 Bomb bay doors inoperative 71 Prop governor 68 Generator 51 Landing gear malfunction 25 Fuel transfer system 24 Miscellaneous 44 Total 1011 27% 6.0

AIRCRAFT AND ACCESSORIES Rack malfunction 127 Bomb release malfunction 78 Oxygen 69 Turrets 15 Electrical system 16 Pathfinder equipment inoperative 15 Instruments 15 Miscellaneous 42 Total 377 10% 2.2

OTHER Gas leak 106 Lost information 80 Personnel sick 63 Leader failed to release 57 Destroyed prior to target 44 Accidental release 30 Spares 29 Late take-off 16 Miscellaneous 245 Total 670 18% 3.9

TOTAL (excluding weather) 2,063 55% 12.1

WEATHER Failed to reach target 1,050 Target area obscured 617 TOTAL weather 1,667 45% 9.9

TOTAL - ALL CAUSES 3,728 100% 22.0

2. BOMBING EFFORT:

Our bombing effort was primarily expended on industrial plants and oil installations on which we dropped 13,464 tons of bombs, (industrial plants 4,920, oil refineries and storage installations 8,544), 45% of the total tonnage. 5,411 tons were dropped on marshalling yards, 2,411 tons on roads and bridges, 1,789 tons on airdromes and landing fields, 785 tons on harbor installations, 795 tons on gun positions, 427 tons on enemy troop concentrations, and our remaining tonnage was expended on targets of opportunity.

3. VICTORIES AND LOSSES:

We destroyed 278 enemy fighters in the air, 125 were probably destroyed and 106 damaged, all of these claims having been evaluated and approved. Interpretation of reconnaissance photographs revealed that 73 enemy fighters and bombers were destroyed on the ground, and 52 were damaged.

Victories in Air 460th 464th 465th 485th Total Destroyed 56 85 75 62 278 Probably destroyed 24 43 17 41 125 Damaged 54 45 15 47 106 Total 134 173 107 150 509

Victories on Ground 460th 464th 465th 485th Total Destroyed 18 20 11 24 73 Damaged 24 12 9 31 52 Total 42 32 20 31 125

We sustained a loss of 364 aircraft in combat during the year, a rate of loss of 2.4 aircraft per 100 sorties. The 485th Bombardment Group maintained the lowest rate of loss of 1.7 aircraft per 100 sorties and the 464th Bombardment Group the highest rate of loss of 3 aircraft per 100 sorties. Our losses were preponderantly attributable to flak; 105 destroyed and the greater portion of the 132 missing aircraft were directly a result of anti-aircraft fire. 60 aircraft were lost thru encounters with enemy fighters. There were 67 other losses, partly attributable to enemy action resulting in the aircraft being crash-landed, jettisoned or abandoned, and partly attributable to personnel and mechanical failures.

                    Enemy               Loss per

              Flak  Missing  Aircraft  Other  Total  100 Sorties

460th Bombardment Group 27 47 7 27 106 2.6 464th Bombardment Group 31 33 26 16 109 3.0 465th Bombardment Group 23 41 15 9 86 2.4 485th Bombardment Group 21 13 12 17 63 1.7 Total 105 132 60 67 364 2.4

There were 1319 encounters with enemy fighters. From 59 encounters which occurred during April, the number steadily increased to 115 in May, reaching a peak during June when there were 401 encounters. 468 encounters occurred during July and dropped off sharply to a low in August, approaching almost complete absence and during November, enemy fighters were conspicuous by their near complete absence and during December, 40 encounters occurred on the mission of the 8th to Bratislava, Austria. The Wing achieved a rate of 21 victories per 100 encounters, a loss of 4.5 aircraft per 100 encounters and a resultant ratio of 4.7 victories per loss.

Bombardment Number * Victories Loss Victories Group Encounters Victories Losses Per 100 Per 100 Per Encounters Encounters Loss 460th 332 56 7 16.9 2.1 8.0 464th 297 85 26 28.6 8.4 3.4 465th 447 75 15 16.8 3.4 5.0 485th 243 62 12 25.5 4.9 5.2 Total 1319 278 60 21.0 4.5 4.7

• Includes enemy aircraft destroyed only.

4. COMBAT CREW SUMMARY:

Upon the advent of operations, 270 combat crews were assigned to the Wing, 30% short of the authorized strength of 96 crews per group. A total of 660 replacement crews were subsequently assigned; during the early months of operations, replacements were primarily absorbed to offset our battle casualties, but gradually during the months of September, October, and November, the number of crews assigned exceeded the rate of battle casualties and losses through rotation. As of 31 December, our assigned number of crews was 102 in excess of our authorized strength of 384 crews for the Wing.

295 crews were battle casualties, and 211 crews were reassigned to the Zone of the Interior upon completion of their tour of duty. The rate of turnover of personnel for the year was 142%, the highest rate being experienced by the 464th Bombardment Group (180%) and the lowest rate by the 485th Bombardment Group (120%).

Combat Crew Analysis Crews Number Battle Crews Rate of Assigned Crews Casualties Rotation At End Turnover Start Gained
460th Bombardment Group 98 178 85 55 106 160% 464th Bombardment Group 66 181 87 59 101 180% 465th Bombardment Group 68 165 73 46 112 130% 485th Bombardment Group 48 136 50 51 85 120% Total 270 660 295 211 404 142%

Our battle casualties, as compiled by the 304th Machine Records Unit of the Fifteenth Air Force, involve 4 255 crew members killed in action, 1580 missing in action, of whom 496 were subsequently returned, 573 captured in action, 75 seriously wounded in action, 75 seriously wounded, and 10 crew members who died of wounds sustained in action.

                                Battle Casualties

                           19 March --- 31 December

                   460th   464th   465th   485th    Total

Killed in Action 76 85 59 35 255 Missing in Action 375 503 506 334 1580 Captured 142 179 121 91 573 Interned 19 48 26 26 93 Died of wounds sus- tained in action 6 1 2 1 10 Seriously wounded in action 17 16 10 32 75 Lightly wounded in action 54 54 44 47 264 Total 656 775 768 542 3250 Returned from MIA 144 139 135 78 496 Returned from capture or internment 28 69 35 3 135 Total 172 208 170 81 631

5. MAINTENANCE EFFICIENCY:

Our rate of maintenance efficiency for the year averaged 73%. The 464th Bombardment Group achieved the highest rate of 76%, the 485th Bombardment Group 74%, the 460th Bombardment Group 70%, and the 465th Bombardment Group 69%. We achieved our highest rate of efficiency during September with 82% of our aircraft being maintained operational each day, dropping off slightly in October to 80% and 76% during November and December.

The average number of aircraft assigned each month prior to November varied from slightly in excess of authorized strength to approximately 10% in excess; during November the strength was 15% short increasing to a shortage of 25% in December. As of 31 December, 177 combat aircraft were assigned to the Wing of which 47 were Pathfinder, a resultant efficiency of 73%, based upon 48 aircraft authorized per group plus 20% authorized reserve, a total of 230 aircraft.

198 aircraft incurred major battle damage which necessitated servicing by the Service Command installations, and 2314 aircraft incurred minor battle damage which was repaired by the maintenance sections of this command.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

1. TOTAL ACCIDENTS:

a. During the period from 19th March to 31st December, 1944, a total of 82 accidents occurred; 35 on operational flights and 47 on non-operational or administrative flights. The 460th Bombardment Group had 28 accidents, the 464th Bombardment Group 23; the 465th Bombardment Group 9, and the 485th Bombardment Group had 31 accidents.

2. RESPONSIBILITY:

a. Pilot error was responsible for 43 of the accidents (52% of the total). Improper handling of the aircraft constituted the largest contributory factor, resulting in 26 accidents, and retracted landing gear accounted for 10 accidents.

b. A total of 30 accidents were attributed to material failure; 9 on operational flights and 21 on non-operational flights. 15 accidents (30% of the total due to material failure) were caused by landing gear malfunctions. Engine Failure accounted for 6 accidents and the remaining 9 accidents were caused by blown tires, faulty brakes and other miscellaneous factors.

3. NATURE:

a. The greatest proportion of accidents took place while attempting to land the aircraft, 42 accidents accounting for 51% of the total accidents for the year. There were 12 accidents each while in the process of take-off and while taxiing and 11 accidents occured during flight. Fire was responsible for 5 aircraft being destroyed while parked, one in the 465th Bombardment Group and four in the 464th Bombardment Group. In the latter group, a fire in the auxiliary power unit ignited the bomb load and destroyed three other adjoining aircraft.

b. The 460th Bombardment Group and the 485th Bombardment Group each had 17 landing accidents, accounting for 81% of the landing accidents in the command. Responsibility was almost equally attributable to improper handling of the aircraft by pilot personnel, malfunction of the landing gear, and failure to check whether or not the wheels were down and properly locked.

4. DAMAGE:

a. Complete wrecks and major damage resulted in 73 of the accidents, 90% of the total. The remaining 9 accidents resulted in minor damage.

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS 19TH MARCH - 31ST DECEMBER 1944

                    OPERATIONAL  NON-OPERATIONAL   TOTAL

                      FLIGHTS       FLIGHTS       #    %

TOTAL ACCIDENTS 35 47 82 100%

RESPONSIBILITY Pilot error 24 19 43 52% Improper handling 17 9 26 Retracted landing gear 3 7 10 Fuel supply 0 2 2 Oversshot 1 0 1 Taxied into obstruction 3 1 4

Material Failure 9 21 30 37% Landing gear 2 13 15 Engine 4 2 6 Tire 0 3 3 Miscellaneous 2 2 4 Fire 1 1 2 Brakes 0 0 0

Ground personnel error 0 3 3 4% Collision with obstruction 0 3 3

Other 2 4 6 7% Fire from flying debris 2 3 5 Unknown 0 1 1

NATURE Landing 14 28 42 51% Take-off 8 4 12 15% Taxiing 5 7 12 15% In flight 8 3 11 13% Parked 0 5 5 6%

DAMAGE Complete wreck 22 14 36 44% Major 11 26 37 46% Minor 3 6 9 10%.

 55th Bomb Wing