Wing History | 55th Bomb Wing

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)

May, 1945, Installment

The 55th Bombardment Wing (H), assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force, was during the period of this Installment in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater of Operations, although no combat missions were executed after 27 April 1945.
On 31 May 1945 the strength of the organization was as follows: 42 Officers assigned (an increase of 2 over 30 April), 4 Officers attached (a decrease of 10 from 30 April), 2 Warrant Officers assigned and none attached (no change), 122 Enlisted Men assigned (a decrease of 5 from 30 April) and 8 Enlisted Men attached (a decrease of 45 from 30 April 1945). This figure represents, in effect, the final organization of the 55th Bombardment Wing, since on 31 May personnel were reassigned to other organizations in large numbers.
There were no combat operations of the 55th Bombardment Wing in May 1945. Indeed, the non-effective mission of 27 April proved to be the final combat formation flown by the Wing's Bombardment Groups and ordered by this headquarters. As the war in Europe drew to its close the immediate effects of the official policy of redeployment became apparent for the Bombardment Groups assigned to this Wing.

First to be affected was the 460th Bombardment Group (H), which, after its 168th mission was ordered for redeployment, conversion to Very Heavy Bombardment, and returned to the United States.

This was accomplished by Warning Order, Letter, Subject: Movement of Troops, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, 370.5(13), 27 April 1945, and by Administrative Order No. 2, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, 27 April 1945. The Group's preparations for movement were executed with promptness and efficiency, and the unit was ready for shipment at the time specified by the order.

The 460th, 464th, and 465th Bombardment Groups were covered by a single order, Letter, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, Subject: Movement of Troops, 370.(17), 15 May 1945, and Administrative Order No. 4, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, 15 May 1945. These Groups were destined for bases of the Transport Command, the 460th Bombardment Group (H) to NATAL, BRAZIL, the 464th and 465th Bombardment Groups (H) to TRINIDAD. The 460th Bombardment Group was next to move, accomplishing its movement to NAPLES on 18 May 1945, and the 464th and 465th Bombardment Groups moved to NAPLES on 23 May 1945. The 55th Bombardment Wing Operations personnel functioned in the movement of aircraft to GIOIA, ITALY, which besides some training missions, was the sum of its operational function during the period of this installment.

In lieu of the analysis of Wing Missions, which has been the usual feature of this Section of the Unit History, the accompanying STATISTICAL TABLES, analyzing the Missions of the 55th Bombardment Wing, is forwarded. While it is intended that the Tables shall speak for themselves, certain observations are of interest and significance.

SUMMARY OF MISSIONS

55TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)

The Wing executed 217 missions, 212 of which were effective. Operations personnel prepared 505 Operations Orders; the combined Operations Orders and Intelligence Annexes wrote up 443 Primary and Alternate Targets - some of these were ordered several times. In the 212 effective missions 328 separate attacks were made on prescribed targets (by aircraft aggregating not less than one "box"; i.e., bombs dropped by Prior Returns are excluded from this number)(1) which were situated in 155 different localities in 10 enemy or enemy occupied countries: AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, GREECE, GERMANY, ITALY, POLAND, RUMANIA, and YUGOSLAVIA.

AUSTRIA felt the weight of the largest number of attacks and the greatest tonnage of bombs, 5,404 sorties dropping 11,971,065 tons in 100 attacks. Approaching these totals were 5,342 sorties dropping 10,848.20 tons on 85 attacks in ITALY. A total of 34 attacks against targets in GERMANY by 2,342 aircraft placed 6,248.085 tons of bombs on the heart of Nazi resistance. HUNGARY was bombed 21 times by 1,755 sorties which dropped 3,789.30 tons. Enemy occupied FRANCE received 19 attacks, in which 1,519 aircraft hit targets with 3,289.35 tons. 1,505 aircraft attacked targets in RUMANIA on 18 occasions, with a total of 3,018.75 tons of bombs. 29 attacks in YUGOSLAVIA were made by 1,066 sorties, with 2,067.56 tons dropped. In CZECHOSLOVAKIA there were 15 attacks by 753 aircraft dropping 1,554.31 tons.

(1) A further exception is that missions executed by individual or by a small number of Pathfinder aircraft, either day or night missions, are counted; these are included because they were executed as ordered.

POLAND and GREECE were seldom attacked; 2 missions against targets in POLAND were flown by 187 aircraft which dropped 444.75 tons, and 2 attacks of targets in GREECE were made by 117 aircraft totalling 272 tons dropped.

As AUSTRIA was the most bombed enemy or enemy occupied country, so also VIENNA was the most bombed city. The Wing executed 22 separate missions against 13 different VIENNA targets, including Industrial Areas (2), a Motor Vehicle Factory (1), an Ordnance Depot(2), 6 missions against 4 different Marshalling Yards, and 10 missions against 6 different Oil Refineries (1 at Schwechat, 1 at Winterhafen, 2 at Korneuburg, 2 at Lobau, 5 against Floris-dorf). A total of 1805 sorties were flown to VIENNA targets, and these aircraft dropped 3,592.10 tons of bombs. It is an indication of the tremendous weight of these attacks that the totals exceed those of sorties and tons dropped on all missions against all targets attacked in HUNGARY (21 attacks, 1755 sorties, 3,589.30 tons) as is true also of missions to FRANCE (19 attacks, 1519 sorties, 3,289.35 tons) and of operations in RUMANIA(18 attacks, 1505 sorties, 3,018.75 tons). Indeed, if targets in the immediate VIENNA area are added (KLOSTERNEUBURG O/R, MOOSBIERBAUM O/R, KAGRANERDORF A/D, WIENER NEUSTADT A/e Engine Factory, WIENER NEUSTADT A/Ds, A/e Engine Factory, Industrial Area, and M/Ys the total of attacks, sorties, and tons dropped on targets in the VIENNA metropolitan area is respectively 38 attacks, 2368 sorties, and 5629.97 tons.

Although Oil, Counter-Air, Harbor and Shipping, Communications, and various tactical targets were attacked in ITALY, the major part of offensive operations there were tactical, in close cooperation with offensives of the XV Army Group.

It was on missions of this type that the closing phase of the Wing's operations was directed. Of significance as illustrating the weight and concentration of maximum effort missions, in 5 attacks between 9 and 17 April 45 in the BOLOGNA area, 721 aircraft dropped 1519.375 tons on enemy positions. On each of 4 of these missions more than 300 tons were dropped with excellent coverage of target areas.

Attacks against targets in GERMANY were particularly concentrated; the 34 bombings were of only 11 localities, only three of which were once each bombed. The main weight was against the BLECHHAMMER Oil Refineries, in GERMAN SILESIA, where, although the target was at extreme range of penetration, in 10 missions (one of them by 5 individually dispatched Pathfinder aircraft) 535 aircraft dropped 1,769.29 tons. MUNICH was bombed 7 times (two of these missions were by a small number of individually dispatched Pathfinder aircraft) and 518 aircraft dropped 1,047.75 tons of bombs on the natal place of Nazism. The Oil Storage, A/c Factory, and A/D at REGENSBURG were severally bombed on three missions, 391 aircraft dropping 770.475 tons. ROSENHEIM and FRIEDRICHSHAFEN were each thrice bombed, the latter missions becoming the classic of the Wing's effort, when 309 aircraft destroyed three top priority targets with 713.25 tons.

Targets in HUNGARY were strategic, including Oil, Counter-Air, and Communications. BUDAPEST, naturally, was the focal point: on 6 missions 503 aircraft dropped 990.225 tons. Of the communications attacks the objective of the strategic bombing was the destruction of targets in advance of the offensive operations of the Russian Armies.

By far the most of the attacks against objectives in FRANCE were related to and aspects of "Operation Dragoon" - the invasion of Southern FRANCE on 15 Aug 44.

Directly a part of this operation, the three missions against Coastal Gun Positions at SETE and ST TROPEZ were brilliantly executed and highly successful, when, bombing by boxes a total of 24 enemy installations were attacked, 334 aircraft dropping 750.85 tons. Highly effective also were attacks, related to the subsequent invasion, against Marshalling Yards and Bridges (Rail and Highway). Oil, Harbor, and Counter-Air objectives were also attacked in FRANCE.

It is almost gratuitous to point out that of targets in RUMANIA the Oil Refineries at PLOESTI were the prime objective. On 9 missions here 807 aircraft devoted 1,539.75 tons to the effort of denying to the enemy his greatest source of natural petroleum products.

The most successful of the 15 attacks in CZECHOSLOVAKIA were those against Oil and Counter-Air targets; destruction of the Oil Refinery at PARDUBICE was all but complete, and scores of enemy aircraft were destroyed in attacks on the PROSSNEV and PRAGUE Airdromes.

Operations against targets in YUGOSLAVIA were conditioned by factors which, while the number of missions was considerable, did not enable major destruction. "Freshman Missions" were the rule for each Bombardment Group as it became operational, and YUGOSLAVIA was the location of suitable targets on which to gain initial combat experience. The chief limitation of effectiveness, however, was that to reduce possible casualties among loyal Partisans it was ordered that targets in YUGOSLAVIA could be bombed only under conditions of full visibility, and the bombing of Targets of Opportunity was prohibited for the same reason. Despite these limitations, targets of strategic importance were successfully attacked, of which BELGRADE and SMEDEREVO Oil Refineries and the MARIBOR Marshalling Yards were the most significant and the most successfully bombed.

Attacks of Oil Refineries were necessarily more concentrated than upon M/Ys. The 62 attacks of this type of target were against only 25 localities. It follows that there was a large number of "repeats"; this was necessitated not by the failure to hit the target but by the fact that the enemy made every effort to repair his oil producing and refining facilities, so that frequent "policing" missions were required. BLECHHAMMER, MOOSBIERBAUM, PLOESTI, and VIENNA accounted for 34 of these attacks and the greater fraction of the 4,569 sorties and 9,850.775 tons dropped on oil targets.

Attacks on Railroad Bridges (23; 995 sorties, 2,162.3 tons), Railroad Diversion Bridges (4; 220 sorties, 542.5 tons), and Highway Bridges (9; 430 sorties, 1,090.75 tons) are details of breakdown of Communications. Most of these targets were related to tactical operations in ITALY and FRANCE.

Of the Counter-Air targets, Airdromes led the list, with 21 attacks, 1,678 sorties, and 3,024.98 tons dropped. In these attacks 152 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 52 damaged (on the ground). Other Counter-Air objectives were Aircraft Factories (9 attacks, 803 sorties, 1,760.25 tons), Aircraft Components Factory (1 mission, 92 sorties, 203.5 tons; this target, the Zeppelin Luftschiffbau at FRIEDRICHSHAFEN, was completely destroyed), and Aircraft Engine Factories (2 attacks, 220 sorties, 480.95 tons).

Completing the total of the 29 types of targets attacked are Ammunition Factory (1 mission, 31 sorties, 69.625 tons), Armament Works (PILSEN Skoda, 1 mission, 93 sorties, 182.25 tons, Army Headquarters (PODGORICA, YUGOSLAVIA, 1 mission of 2 aircraft destroying the target with 4.50 tons) a Chemical Plant (FRIEDRICHSHAFEN Oberraderach, heavily damaged on 1 mission, 97 sorties, 213.5 tons), an Engine Factory (1 mission, 83 aircraft, 181.7 tons), a Fuel Depot (1 attack, 24 sorties, 60 tons), a Motor Transport Repair Depot (1 attack, 71 sorties, 176.25 tons), a Motor Transport Factory in VIENNA (1 mission, 62 sorties, 151 tons), a Railroad Bypass (1 mission, 62 sorties, 126.5 tons), a Railroad Viaduct (AVISO, 1 attack, 43 sorties, 105 tons), Tank Works (2 missions, 118 sorties, 279 tons), and 3 Towns (5 attacks, 387 sorties, 435.5 tons). Attacks on Coastal Gun Positions, Enemy Positions, Military Stores, and Troop Concentrations have been included in the figures cited for Tactical Targets.

It is of interest that the maximum number of aircraft bombing on a single mission was 163 (the targets were enemy positions in advance of the Fifth Army), and that the maximum tonnage dropped was 383.5 (this was on Mission No. 199, 19 Mar 45, the first anniversary of the beginning of the Wing's combat operations).

The grand totals of the Wing's achievements are as follows: 217 Wing Missions, 770 Bombardment Group Missions, 25,447 sorties of which 19,710 aircraft dropped bombs as effective sorties (there were 2,964 ineffective sorties due to weather and 2,773 sorties ineffective for other reasons). The 19,710 aircraft bombing (this total includes prior returns) dropped 43,909.285 tons of bombs.

126 aircraft were lost to flak, 60 were lost to enemy aircraft, and 97 were lost by other causes; 156 aircraft were reported missing. It is noteworthy that the rate of loss was extremely low: 1.9%. 318 aircraft suffered severe and 312 sustained light battle damage. There were 1,325 encounters with enemy aircraft; 278 e/a were destroyed, 125 probably destroyed, and 106 damaged in aerial combat; thus there were 4.7 victories per loss. 151 e/a were destroyed and 92 were damaged on the ground.

From any point of view these figures are impressive. The significant fact, in which all personnel of the 55th Bombardment Wing can take pride, is that they attest success in combat. When this organization was changed in status from an OTU to a combat Wing these achievements were in the unknown future, but they materialized by reason of one basic and underlying fact: the capability of the Wing Commander. Combat furnished the occasions and the opportunities of the outstanding success which is but one, albeit the most important one, of the many reasons for which General Acheson has and has always had the complete and unswerving loyalty of personnel under his inspiring command.

There were no promotions of key personnel in May 1945. Changes of key personnel were as follows: On 21 May 1945 Major Frank T. DePersia, Signal Officer, Major Robert S. Felknor, Technical Inspector, and Major Andrew Meinor, Engineering Officer, were relieved from assignment and were assigned to the U.S. Aerial Port of Embarkation per Letter Order, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force. On 22 May Major Wesley D. Colmar was transferred to this headquarters from the 465th Bombardment Group (H) and subsequently assigned Wing Adjutant, vice Major Edward J. McClure. On 25 May 1945 Lt Col Raymond H. Leisenheimer, Assistant A-4, was relieved from assignment and reassigned to the 465th Bombardment Group (H), per S.O. 144, paragraph 5, Headquarters 55th Bombardment Wing (H).
There was no ceremony for award and decoration in May 1945. Recommendations for the award of the Bronze Star Medal were accepted by higher headquarters, and the Bronze Star Medal awarded to the following personnel: Lt Col George S. Congdon, Major Andrew Meinor, Major Edward J. McClure, 1st Sgt William H. Scorgin, T/Sgt William S. Martens, and T/Sgt Anderson C. Singleton.
Following the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE, advantage was taken of all Rest Camp privileges, with CANNES and NICE, FRANCE being the most popular choice. Personnel also visited CAIRO and PALESTINE, CAPRI, ROME, and SAN SPIRITO. With ample time available physical training was a larger interest. The War Department film, "Two Down and One to Go" was shown. Greater emphasis was placed upon the Orientation and the Information and Education programs. The usual resources of U.S.O. shows and moving pictures were utilized.
V-E Day was received quietly. It had become obvious that the end of the war in EUROPE was near, and as the final phase was reached and passed all were mentally and emotionally prepared for what had, for this organization, already occurred in the cessation of combat operations. However, the question of the destination of the Wing and of individuals engaged everyone's interest, and interest became the keener as the Bombardment Groups assigned received their movement orders and departed their Bases. It was not until the last day of the month that any definite indication of the future for the organization and its personnel came. On 31 May 1945 Brigadier General Acheson acquainted personnel with the outlook: that transfers and reassignments were to be expected, flying personnel soon to be returned to the United States, and others to be sent to Replacement Depots until reassigned. Officially the Wing is to remain intact.

Preparations for possible movement had already been begun, materials no longer required for operations were destroyed or returned to higher headquarters according to directives, all non-essential records were destroyed, and supplies not needed were turned in. The effort was made to have preparations for change as far advanced as possible, and this objective was well attained. It is surprising, in fact, how little remains to do when the official order is received.

The 55th Bombardment Wing (H) had, as the accompanying Statistical Tables show, a distinguished combat record. Its history was made in action.

No little satisfaction can be taken in that history as it has been made and, insofar as words can record, recorded. Doubtless it should be possible to take satisfaction that military necessities for the prosecution of the remaining phases of the war do not require the efforts of this organization. However that may be, the Historical Officer can find no satisfaction whatever in writing what, to all practical purposes, is the finis to the chronicle of its achievements.

Wing History May 1945

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