Unit Citation | 885th Bomb Squadron

885TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) (SPECIAL). For outstanding performance of duty in armed conflict with the enemy. Assigned the difficult and extremely hazardous task of delivering, by night dropping operations, approximately 67,000 pounds of arms, ammunition and special supplies to units of the French Forces of the Interior at strategic and diversionary targets scattered throughout France, the ground crews worked diligently and untiringly to insure the mechanical perfection of their aircraft to enhance the success of this highly important mission. On the night of 12 August 1944, eleven (11) heavily loaded heavy bombardment type aircraft took off and individually, alone and unescorted, set course for their respective destinations. In the complete darkness of a moonless night, by the use of celestial navigation and dead reckoning insofar as navigation is concerned, with virtually no radio navigational aids available, all targets were accurately reached. Under these adverse conditions, flying blind on instruments over 1200 miles, were required to fly at low altitudes over hostile and unfamiliar terrain, despite the presence of mountains, in the immediate vicinity of their targets. Reaching the objectives, descents were made to altitudes as low as 500 feet, where dropping runs were extended air speeds. Flying in the immediate vicinity of numerous fighter airdromes, within range of all light and heavy enemy anti-aircraft able to observe them visually, accomplished their assigned tasks with unerring accuracy. On the return flight, though pursued by enemy aircraft, they successfully evaded the enemy and all aircraft returned safely to base. Through their extraordinary skill in night navigation and instrument flying, each crew reached its specified target and completed their objectives with 100% success. A total of 67,000 pounds of supplies were dropped to the French Forces of the Interior, at strategic points for the immediate use in the support of the pending invasion. Eighteen (18) active agents were safely dispatched to take their vital parts in the preparations by the Underground Army. In addition 225,000 leaflets, alerting the population of three (3) large cities in Southern France, were disseminated. Approximately 3500 square miles covered by the Squadron in this operation provided valuable stores of arms which the Maquis were able to give invaluable aid to the Allied invasion of Southern France. By the outstanding courage, professional skill and determination of the combat crews, together with the superior technical skill and intense devotion to duty of the ground personnel, the 885th Bombardment Squadron has reflected great credit upon itself and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF OPERATION

THE OPERATION.

On the night of 12 August 1944, the 885th Bombardment Squadron (H) (Special) achieved an outstanding success in night dropping operations. Not only did every bomber successfully reach and deliver at intended (18) agents were safely dispatched. 67,000 pounds of supplies were dropped to Committees of the French Forces of the Interior. In addition 225,000 leaflets were dispatched to fall on thickly populated areas. This achievement was the more remarkable because each plane flew an independent sortie, alone and unescorted, across the Mediterranean from Blida Airport to the Coast of France and, from there, inland over unfamiliar, enemy occupied terrain. The operation was at night during the dark period of the moon. Entrance over the French Coast had to be exact to avoid heavily defended flak areas. Flights were made in the vicinity of airfields on which one hundred and sixty (160) enemy planes were concentrated. A further danger lay in the necessity of making target runs at reduced airspeeds and low elevation despite the presence of surrounding mountains. Because of the extreme urgency of supplying the F. F. I. for the vital task of giving effectual support to the Allied Invasion of Southern France, a special effort was made by the 885th Bombardment Squadron (H) (Special) to overcome the hazards and difficulties of this mission. The complete success achieved was a material contribution to the brilliant victory of the Allied Invasion and a tribute to the devotion to duty and intrepid flying of the Squadron.

TARGETS.

At 1000 hrs. on 12 August 1944, Combined Operations of O.S.S. and I.S.9.M.O., together with Colonel Mac Closkey, had selected targets for the night of 12 August 1944. The bulk of the night's load was to be dropped to Committees in the Maquis immediately in the rear of the projected invasion area. In addition, agents were to go on to targets in other critical areas. The night's operation covered an area bounded on the West by the Greenwich Meridian - 0° and on the East by 7°51'E; on the North by 45°40'N and on the South by 43°51'N - an area constituting nearly all of France south of 46°N. Targets in which the terrain was most difficult were "Assurance" and "Quills" in the Department of the Basses Alpes and "Ferdinand" and "Elizabeth" in the Department of the Hautes Pyrenees. These were in mountainous areas where it was necessary to descend, for a drop, well below the altitude of surrounding peaks.

NAVIGATION.

Early in the afternoon of 12 August, the Navigators reported to Lieutenant Partridge, Squadron Navigator, to draw up the flight plans. Each Bombardier traced, from a 1:100,000 map, a detailed chart of his targets for the night's operations. All aircraft were routed to fly out over Cape Sidi Feruch on the North African Coast and pin point on definite capes of the Balearic Islands. Those going to Western France pin pointed on Cape Palos, Malorka. From these check points, aircraft going to the west were to proceed to Cape Creus for a further pin point. Selecting specific points, for crossing the French Coast, in conformity with their target locations, two aircraft were to make their entrance at the Franco-Spanish Border while one went directly to Lake Thau. Aircraft from the Maiorka pin point were to cross the French Coast either in the vicinity of La Ciotat or Cape Benat, proceeding at each point. River junctions were selected, wherever possible, for inland pinpoints or target I. P's, as other terrain features were virtually indistinguishable at night during the dark period of the moon. Reciprocal headings were taken for the return flights.

APPROACH.

The Bombardier's target charts were carefully examined in planning headings for target runs to enable descent to minimum altitude without danger of crashing into a mountain peak. The usual target signals were to be three (3) lights in a row with a fourth light flashing a code letter. The lights were not to be lit until the aircraft was sighted circling the D. Z. Air-to-ground committee. An attempt was to be made to fly directly up the line of lights on the target run unless the terrain permitted a run in only one direction.

BRIEFING.

The crews were briefed at 1700 hrs. Colonel Mac Closkey emphasized the importance of the operation, pointing out that special care must be taken, regardless of terrain, to drop personnel and containers at low altitudes to assure accurate delivery on the grounds. He emphasized the necessity of dropping at retarded airspeeds so that the impact of the opening shock would not tear away parachutes. This was the more important as eight (8) of the eleven (11) aircraft were to dispatch agents and two (2) of whom were French Women Radio Operators. He brought out the fact that F. F. I. were hard pressed for supplies at that critical time and that every effort must be made by air crews to reach their targets and make successful drops.

OPERATIONS.

The Operations Officer gave detailed instructions as to the time of take offs. Each aircraft was to proceed individually to its primary target and if no reception were found there, then to set course for alternate targets. Running lights were to be turned off at the Balearic Islands and remain off unless another aircraft were seen in circuit at a mutual target. Guns were to be tested between a point twenty (20) miles off the African Coast and at least twenty (20) miles before reaching the Balearic Islands. Gun crews were to take their stations when fifty (50) miles off the French Coast and remain there on active watch until relieved from their stations by order of the pilot after coming out of France.

INTELLIGENCE.

The enemy situation for the night was reviewed by the Squadron Intelligence Officer. Flak concentrations on the French Coast, in the vicinity of proposed courses, were pointed out. These were at Port Vendres near the Franco-Spanish Border, at Mont St. Clair, near Cette (Sete) Thau, at Montpellier, Marseille, Toulon and the Coast from Cannes to Nice. Dangerous areas immediately behind the Coast were Perpignan and Corbiers Airdrome at the extreme western entrances, Montpellier and Nimes-Courbessac Airdromes in the Central area. The Istres, Salon and Avignon areas were to be avoided. Flights in the vicinity of the Grande Bastide and Cuers Airdromes were to keep out of range of the flak and rockets that had been encountered there on previous nights. Cones of searchlights were to be expected at any of the Airdromes mentioned. One hundred and sixty (160) enemy aircraft were reported on these Airdromes. Perpignan, Istres, Salon and St. Victoire were to be avoided. The fact that an aircraft of the 885th Squadron had been attacked, by three (3) enemy fighter planes in the Toulouse area on the previous night and pursued with intermittent fire all the way to the Balearic Islands, was pointed out and all crews were warned to maintain an alert watch for patrolling enemy planes.

ENGINEERING.

Engineering had serviced all planes for scheduled take offs but trouble had been experienced with the hydraulic system of B-24 type bomber number 006. The ground crews worked feverishly in clearing the hydraulic system and installing a new accumulator, enabling the aircraft to take off. In testing his controls prior to taking off, Lieutenant Wesley in B-17 type aircraft number 689, discovered defects in his right stabilizer. An emergency ground crew immediately went to work to repair the defects enabling this aircraft to make a late take off. All other aircraft took off as scheduled. There were no turn backs.

MISSION REPORTS.

Appendix I has mission reports giving details of each sortie with target maps.

RADIO COMMUNICATION.

On the night of 12 August 1944, watch was opened on the Air to Ground Radio Net at 2025 hrs. Although radio silence was maintained by all aircraft enroute to the target, each radio operator monitored the air-ground frequency during the entire mission and enroute was permitted to transmit only in case of an emergency. In order to make certain that all radio operators were monitoring the proper frequency at all times, a series of numbers was transmitted by the ground station for a period of three (3) minutes, beginning on the hour and half hour, until the first weather forecast was transmitted. The first weather forecast was transmitted at 0030 hrs. Although all radio operators were briefed to copy each weather forecast as it was transmitted, none were received by the planes until they had left the target area. Our ground station transmitter developed keying-relay trouble and went off the air at 0005. A transmitter mechanic, who is on duty at all times when the transmitter is in operation, immediately repaired the relay and the transmitter was back on the air at 0008 hrs. At 0430 hrs., the Officer of the Day received a message from the British Flying Control Section, stating that an enemy aircraft was heading North in the general direction of one of our returning aircraft (O/S YFPH). This message was immediately encoded and transmitted to our aircraft, the message including a warning to alert all crews for a possible enemy attack on their return flight. At 0440 hrs., radio operator Graham in aircraft number 500 (O/S YFPU) began transmitting. All aircraft reported to the ground station in succession acknowledging receipt of the weather message and giving their estimated time of arrival back to base, as well as reporting their success or failure at the target.

Refer to Appendix II for detailed radio operators' log.

EVALUATION.

A military evaluation of the effect of the operation, though less tangible than that of a bombing mission, far exceeds the weight of supplies dropped. The work of the French Forces of the Interior prior to, during and after the invasion of Southern France, has been considered to equal that of several army divisions. Air transport was the sole means of organizing and supplying the F. F. I. On the night of 12 August 1944, the 885th Bombardment Squadron (H) (Special), who had been making nightly flights to secret rendezvous at Maquis Targets since April 1944, achieved its greatest success in the complete fulfillment of each sortie, on that night, delivering 67,000 pounds of arms and ammunition and eighteen (18) agents at critical areas in the interior. This achievement, climaxing a record of continuous and intrepid night sorties despite the hazards of weather, low altitude flying amid mountain peaks, intense anti-aircraft fire and enemy fighter opposition, is a tribute to the courage and devotion to duty of the crews and their specialized skill in night flying. The operation on the night of 12 August 1944 was a direct and measurable contribution to the success of the Allied Armies in the invasion of Southern France. It reflects great honor on the 885th Bombardment Squadron (H) (Special) and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

[Signature]

MONRO MAC CLOSKEY, Colonel,

Air Corps, Commanding.

Proposed Citation

Veteran Roster

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