Unit History | September 1944 | 885th Bomb Squadron

UNIT HISTORY

FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944

HEADQUARTERS 885TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) (SPECIAL) APO 520

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHANNELS AND TARGET SELECTION

Engaged in its highly specialized type of operations, the 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special) is unique in the Fifteenth Air Force. The Squadron is administratively under Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters but is operating directly under U.S.S.A.F. Its targets during September were selected by the O.S.S. and S.O.E. through the Special Project Operations Headquarters in Algiers. They originated at the Field Staffs of O.S.S. and S.O.E. with some special by I.S.L.D. A special liason section known as S.P.O.C. was created to coordinate the priority of targets and it was with representatives of this section that the Commanding Officer of the 885th Squadron, Colonel MacCloskey, each morning worked out a selection of targets. The usual procedure was for Colonel MacCloskey, after consultation with weather forecasters, to determine the area in which operations would be conducted for the night by Squadron aircraft available for missions. S.P.O.C. representatives would then decide upon the priority of targets within that area and furnish alternates for each mission to give a weather spread. S.P.O.C. agencies then contacted "The Field" by arranged signal and Colonel MacCloskey alerted his crews. All of this was accomplished before noon.

FLIGHT PREPARATION

During the afternoon before a mission the Squadron target board, in the briefing and navigator's room, was set up for the Navigators and Bombardiers to draw up their flight plans. The Squadron Navigator plotted course lines on the situation map in conformance with known enemy flak positions, terrain features and suitable recognition pinpoints. The general pattern and boundaries of the mission areas were given to the Aircraft Navigator and by the Intelligence Officer as to enemy action. While the aircraft Navigator was drawing up his flight plan, the Bombardier drew a detailed sketch from a 1:100,000 map of the target area. From this target map a run at minimum altitude was planned by the pilot and bombardier. While the navigator was busy working out mileages, headings and time, the load lists and loads were given to the Armament Officer. The containers and packages to be carried were stored in a "Bomb Dump" operated by O.S.S. adjacent to aircraft dispersal and the loading was carried on by Squadron personnel especially trained in this work. Each target required a specialized load. The 885th was the closest of the 68 MACAF squadrons to full bomb load capability of their aircraft with additional packages or agents making up the remainder of the load. A normal gross weight of six thousand (6000) pounds was considered a good load. During June, July, August and September, 1944, fifty thousand (50,000) pounds of leaflets at the request of The Psychological Warfare Board on each mission. Leaflets were thrown out of the waist windows, bomb bay containers were toggled by the Bombardier while containers and packages in the waist were pushed out of the cargo hatch by one of the gunners when the Bombardier flashed a light signal. When agents were carried a similar method was employed. At 1700 hours the crews were briefed on their mission with a final word by Colonel MacCloskey, who by the 1st of September, had participated in 103 sorties (89 of these flights into enemy territory). Take offs were generally scheduled according to moon and weather. Because of the prevalence of an early morning ground fog at base during September, it was generally decided that take offs should be sufficiently early to permit a return to base by 0300 or 0330 hours. Occasionally aircraft were scheduled for 1530 or 1600 take offs but generally they were later. In clear moonlight the take offs were usually between 1900 and 2000 hours. Towards the end of the month such take offs were necessarily under night conditions.

CONDUCT OF FLIGHT

Courses had been selected to obtain a maximum of night recognition features. In order of suitability these features were coastlines, lakes, river junctions, mountains and highways. In full moonlight, with good visibility, all of these ground features could be distinguished from as much as 6000 feet above the ground. During the dark period recognition was greatly reduced though on a clear night, pilotage was possible with special reference to coastlines and river junctions. The responsibility for observation of the ground was assigned to the Bombardier who was blacked out in curtains in the nose. He was the night eyes of the aircraft and reported the plane's positions, over the interphone, to the Navigator who worked on his air plot. The Bombardier "took over" at the target and guided the pilot on the target run. On occasions the waist gunner acted as a lookout for packet or agent dispatching. The Navigator kept a running position of the aircraft's flight. Drift was calculated over water by dropping flares on which the tail gunner could sight. A special calibration in the tail gunner's sight gave a drift reading. Whenever weather permitted star observation, the Navigator "shot stars" and verified his position by celestial navigation. When weather permitted star observation. These equipment was not used but the aircraft were equipped with "Rebeccas" which could, however, be used only on the few targets that were equipped with "Eurekas". Flying at night, through all kinds of weather and in the dark period (of the moon) over lands of minimum altitude and varied weather, Navigators of the 885th Squadron are called for a higher degree of perfection in their work than is required by any other tactical navigation undertaken by the United States Air Forces. The flying in night operations carried on by the 885th Bombardment Squadron (H) Special is of a most exacting nature. Four factors contributed largely to the many difficult situations which generally prevailed during the Squadron's September missions. To begin with, the missions were flown entirely on instruments, with instrument take offs and instrument let downs at the target. Though the automatic pilot could be used in good weather, during part of the flight, most of the flying over enemy territory necessarily had to be done manually. Where flak was encountered, evasive action had to be taken at comparatively low altitude or less than 6000 feet. Throughout prolonged periods of bad weather, the aircraft had to be flown on instruments. With missions of from five (5) to seven (7) hours duration, these conditions produced excessive pilot fatigue. Secondly, the Squadron undertook sorties under weather conditions through which bombing missions would rarely be attempted. It was a common occurrence, with reasonable weather at base in the hope of satisfactory weather at the target, for delays in takeoff. Frequently forecasts of weather at the target area would prove to be incorrect and a target would have to be abandoned with diversion to alternate targets. Occasionally base weather conditions would change during the progress of a mission to an extent that made it necessary to divert returning aircraft to another landing field. Weather factors were carefully considered by Colonel MacCloskey in scheduling missions but during September, in order to carry on the important work, it frequently became necessary to fly through most adverse weather conditions. A third difficulty which the pilot encountered on these missions arose in the necessity of flying in the darkness in mountainous terrain in the vicinity of mountain peaks. This necessity had prevailed during the period when the Squadron was flying to French targets in the Maritime Alps. After the landing in Southern France targets were shifted to northwestern Italy, nightly flights involved flying over mountainous terrain at elevations lower than the surrounding mountain peaks. At the target it was necessary to let down to a low elevation over the terrain. Here a fourth difficulty was faced in that air speeds had to be reduced for operational requirements. Indicated airspeeds were reduced to 150 miles per hour and in some instances in B-17 flights, speeds were reduced to 120 miles per hour. At this speed control became sloppy and it was only with the greatest of pilot skill that such runs could be safely made. As is true of Navigators in the 885th, pilots of this Squadron are called upon for a higher degree of technical skill than is to be found in any other American Air Force unit engaged in tactical operations.

During missions the Squadron Communications net work maintained contact with the aircraft by sending periodic weather information. The planes maintained radio silence until crossing the enemy coast on the return trip. Target and code reports of "Field" acknowledgment of reception of a package or failure of the mission. If a diversion had to be made because of weather at base, instructions for the diversion were sent out by the Squadron Radio Facilities. The Communications Section also established and maintained a curve at the base to assist landings under difficult conditions of visibility.

It is believed that the 885th Squadron has originated several highly important practices to increase the efficiency of its specialized task. Colonel MacCloskey carried out a rigid training program for crews entering from Bombardment duties in daylight formation flying to night dropping operations. This was of untold value to Pilots and Navigators and Bombardiers who were making a transition from daylight formation flying to night dropping operations. The intensive use of radio instruments and the Squadron transmitting facilities have provided an important safety factor. Aircraft of the Squadron have developed bomb bay equipment and loading methods that have increased the load carrying capacity of the aircraft by as much as 50%. Considerable thought has been given and care taken in the modification of B-17 and B-24 type planes. Finally, by the careful selection of alternate targets and attention to weather areas, operations have been given a greater chance of success. The Squadron has established a splendid record of achievement as is indicated by the commendations that it has received.

Unit History September 1944

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