Annex 1 Part 1 | Frantic Three | Operational Plan

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

APO 520 U S ARMY

11 July 1944

ANNEX NO. I

COMBAT OPERATION ON ROUTE

Fifteenth Air Force Plan for Operation “FRANTIC THREE”

PART ONE

INTELLIGENCE FOR THE ATTACK

ENEMY SITUATION

Ground: The Russian offensive in the North is advancing on a 250-mile front in a 2-pronged drive on Brest-Litovsk. The capture of Vilno places them within 150 miles of Konigsbarg and the Baltic Sea. The whole Northern front is seriously threatened. Large numbers of the German Army have been rendered “hors de combat” while the best indication of their size and speed of the drive is reflected in the killing of 13 and the capture of 15 German Corps and Division Commanders. Another Russian offensive has just begun to develop along a 100 mile front in the Lwow-Kowel sector which presents far reaching possibilities. The Carpathian-Galatz sectors have been quiet for the past 6 to 8 weeks.

Air: Tactical operations of the German Air Force on the North front have not been extensive during the latest drive. On the central front there has been some activity particularly from bases at Lwow, Mielec, Krosno, Radom and Deblin. It is believed that aircraft flown from these bases staged the serious attack upon Eighth Air Force Bombers the night of their arrival at Russian fields. Incomplete photo cover of airdromes in this area reveals 200 to 250 enemy aircraft, principally twin engine bombers, many of which are non-operational. To what extent developments on the northern and Kowel-Lwow fronts will effect movement or employment of enemy aircraft is problematical. Withdrawal, at the same time giving support to hard pressed ground units, is considered likely. On the Southern front, latest photo cover of fields East of Ploesti reveals over 400 aircraft of all types but principally single engine fighters, ground support aircraft and medium bombers. This figure is a reduction of approximately 100 from the strength of 6 weeks ago, but the reduction is considered temporary and current activity of ground support units and air transport will continue in near future.

TARGETS

Plan A: Target selected for strafing attack by two fighter groups is Mielec Airdrome, a factory airfield for Heinkel 111’s and 177’s located at 50^o19’ N, 21^o28’ E, altitude 575 feet. It is a large field approximately 1700 x 1700 yards with two paved runways one north and south, the other east and west. The flight hangars are located in the Northeast corner, repair hangars in the Southwest corner and the main workshops and sub-assembly shops in the Southeast corner. Activity at this airdrome has been great and from 80 to 170 aircraft, including from 50 to 85 He 111’s have been photographed, comparatively andispersed, at different times.

Target Material: Annotated print showing obstructions at and around the A/D. Latest possible Recon. photo annotated to show location of aircraft on the ground.

Target chart No. 16-8-NA

HI Report No. 193 dated 22 April 1944

C Report No. 777 dated 11 May 1944

In support of this attack, the remainder of the Air Force will be assigned other targets in the area while a substantial bombing attack is to be made on installations around the Mielec A/D timed to strike some time after the strafing attack.

Plan B: Target selected for strafing attack by two fighter groups is Zilistea A/D, 45^o13’ 00” N, 26^o57’ 35” E. altitude 360 feet. A large rectangular field, grass surface, measuring 2500 yards WNW-ESE by 3150 yards NNE – SSW, with one runway and 2 other landing areas plus 3 dispersal areas, N. E. and W. perimeters, grouped around the central workshops, barracks, and a fourth dispersal area. Photos of 28 June show 175 A/C present (75 SEF, 21 Me 110, 22 Ju 87, 30 He 129 and various other types of A/C).

Target Material: Annotated print to show obstructions at and near A/D.

Latest possible Recon. photo annotated to show location of A/C on the ground.

Target chart No. 11-8-NA

Detailed Int. Reports No. C 509 and C 770

In support of this attack, the remainder of the Air Force will frag other A/D targets in the area with special emphasis on Zilistea A/D some time after the strafing attack.

DEFENSES

Ground: Plans A and B, see relevant flak maps and E reports. Latest information and complete flak maps based on available cover to show locations of light and heavy guns will be delivered to participating groups.
Air:

Plan A: It is estimated that the enemy is capable of putting up 50 – 75 SEF and 20 – 25 Fighter Bombers in the Mielec area. It is appreciated that interception of fighter groups enroute to target is unlikely due to presence of bomber formations and G. A. F. reluctance to attack fighters when alone. Possibility exists that no interception at target will be made due to speed, timing of whole operation, difficulties of G. A. F. control, and surprise element.

Plan B: It is estimated that the enemy is capable of putting up 50 S.E.F. German in Ploesti area and 50 S.E.F. German plus 40-50 Fighter Bombers in the target area. Appreciate that interception of fighter groups enroute to and in target area unlikely for same reasons given under Plan A.

REPORTING

To be made according to Standard Operating Procedure on Fifteenth Air Force forms. The Senior Fifteenth Air Force Intelligence Officer at Headquarters Russian Base will make necessary decisions and arrangements for all reporting in both signal and written form.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

What degree of surprise was accomplished by the attack?
How many aircraft were put up by enemy defensive effort, where were they met, what were their tactics? In what direction did they approach originally?
What was the type and disposition of ground defenses?
Were any concentrations of aircraft noticed on airdromes other than the A/D attacked?

ESCAPE AND EVASION

Refer to Escape Bulletins No. 13, 29, 32 and 34 and Annex No. 2, Intelligence Annex.

Annex 1, Part 1: Operation Frantic Three