15th Army Air Forces; WWII
15th Army Air Forces; WWII

J L Giblin

98th Bombardment Group 02/20/1943

HEADQUARTERS                                                               J/15/11-239

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

Office of the Communications Officer

APO 520

18 November, 1943.

REPORT OF INTERROGATION BY COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

  1.  The following is a summary of the interrogation of 2nd Lt. J. L. Giblin, from the communications standpoint.  Lt. Giblin was the co-pilot of a B-24 aircraft of the 98th Bomb Group which landed at the enemy-held airdrome at Pachino, Sicily, on the evening of February 20, 1943.  Lt. Giblin had his Jack Box switch on inter-phone position so that his knowledge of what was happening on the radio-compass and the Command Set is almost negligible.

After attacking Naples one engine was knocked out and was feathered.  Another engine was causing trouble so the crew decided to attempt to land at Malta.  The radio operator obtained a CDM from the D/F station at Malta and the pilot tuned the radio compass to the frequency of the Malta beacon.  This took place about an hour and a half or two hours away from Naples and the two bearings checked.  By using W/T the radio operator requested that landing lights be turned on at Malta.  The crew was considerably confused and the navigator was not certain that the land visible was actually Malta.  They flew numerous random courses to attempt to determine their position, meanwhile watching the radio compass indicator.  Their gasoline supply was now very low.  Landing lights were turned on at an airdrome below and were then quickly turned off.  Presently a green flare was sent up from the ground and the landing lights came on again.  The landing lights were not set in any pattern customarily used by the British.  As far as Lt. Giblin could remember the command set was not used to request landing instructions.  As soon as the aircraft came to a halt the airdrome landing lights were immediately turned off.  Shooting began so the bomb-sight and the IFF Set were destroyed.

  1. The lessons to be learned from this experience are as follows:
    1. Suspect any variation from normal procedure.  In this incident the lack of R/T airdrome control, firing of single green flare and the unusual layout of airdrome lighting should have aroused suspicion.
    2. Check and re-check methodically.  Confusion arose in this incident because land was seen which was thought to be Malta.  The aircraft then flew over the land haphazardly, trying to confirm this.  A better course of action would have been to fly straight on over the land, meanwhile requesting repeated QDM’s.  If it had been Malta the QDM’s would have changed through 180o as also would the indicator on the radio compass.
    3. Be certain each pilot, co-pilot and navigator thoroughly understands the use of the radio compass.  The radio compass indicator turned through 360o when the aircraft circled over the land visible below.  The crew incorrectly took this as an indication that they had circled the beacon and, thus, were over Malta.  On the contrary, if the aircraft had actually circled the beacon the pointer would have remained practically stationary.
    4. When lost, compare QDM’s and radio compass indications with each other continuously.
    5. When lost, as in this incident, use the colors of the day over any airdrome and do not land unless proper acknowledgement is received.

 

For the Communications Officer:

E.C. TITCOMB,

Capt., Air Corps,

Asst. Communications Officer.

Official US Army Air Forces Combat Report by J L Giblin of the 98th Bombardment Group. This material is a transcription of official reports-testimonials of J L Giblin's combat experience.

Arrow  98th Bombardment Group