15th Army Air Forces; WWII
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Report: Mission to Eastern Command, USSTAF

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

APO 520                       U.S. Army

5 August, 1944

REPORT:  Mission to Eastern Command, USSTAF

BY        :  Lt. Colonel L. A. Neveleff, A-2 Section, Fifteenth Air Force.

I.  MISSION – Ordered 8 July by C. G., Fifteenth Air Force, to proceed to Eastern Command Bases with ground echelon of Frantic III Project.  Departed Vincenza 9 July, 0800 hours, purposes, as follows:

  1. Assist insofar as possible in the Intelligence organization and planning of the immediate Frantic project, all Intelligence Operations as regards this, however, to be under control of Lt. Colonel Gomez, A-2, 306 Wing.
  2. To report fully on the organization and current status of Intelligence at Eastern Command, specifically as regards progress of targeting suitable strategic objectives in Poland, East Prussia, and other regions generally out of range of MAPRW and 15th Combat Mapping Squadron.  This survey to cover specifically:
  1. Status of Intelligence Planning.
  1. Organization of Photo Activities.
    1. Interpretation.
    2. Capacity.
    3. Dissemination.
  1. Status of Information from Ground Sources.
  1. Field Organization.

II.  ITINERARY. – Departed Vincenza 0800 hours, 9 July 1944, arrived Poltava 1420 hours, 13 July.  Visited Mirgorod and Pyriatin 13 and 14 July.  Departed for Moscow 20 July.  Returned Poltava 24 July.  Departed Poltava 26 July.  Returned Bari 4 August.  Total mileage flown 9400.

III.  INTELLIGENCE PLANNING.

  1. Personnel – The presentheadquarters staff consists of four officers and two enlisted men as follows:
  1.  Major J. A. Kellogg, Senior Intelligence Officer.  This officer is a Photo Interpreter, having occupied that position in the 2nd Bomb Division, Eighth Air Force.  No previous executive or targeting experience and is somewhat confused by the problems the current situation poses.
  2. Captain D. Sheldon, Asst. to Major Kellogg.  Is attempting to handle targeting and organize current information.  No previous experience in this phase.  Did General Intelligence at 41st Combat Wing, 1st Division, Eighth Air Force.
  3. Captain Fred Hamm, Reports, egc.  Was a Squadron S-2 in Ninth Air Force.
  4. Captain Bozarth, Navigator with no previous Intelligence background.  Handles Enemy Order of Battle, and attempts to handle current airdrome situation.
  5. One enlisted draftsman and one Intelligence clerk.
  6. One Russian, parttime, ground Interpreter (photo)
  1. Operations – The intelligence section lacks direction, force authority, and is completely ignored insofar as prior information or consultation is concerned.  There is apparently no overall plan for the laying on of Photo Cover.  The Command is entirely on its own insofar as continuous information and direction from USSTAF is concerned.  One covering directive was left by Colonel Weiker, but judging from current observation and list of cover flown (Appendix A) the photo effort is definitely on the aimless side.

Duplication of effort in the southern sector is obvious.  The only purpose served apparently, is information to the Russians on the status of airdromes in Eastern Roumania, which, apparently, they do not regard in the light of any great contrubution.

Organization of routine cover, and direction of search for priority target system objectives is completely lacking.

Weather and the increasing distance from bases to Russian Front lines has been a limiting factor on cover to the North.  There has also been active opposition on the part of the Russian authorities to any photo activity in the Riga region.  However, the greatest obstacle to the development of targeting in East Prussia and Poland is the absence of specific information or even reasonable hypotheses as to what and where to seek.

Lacking authority, respect, and definite orientation; the Intelligence aspect of the operation is completely subordinated to purely operational considerations with results as listed in preceding paragraphs.  Colonel Cullen appears to be exceedingly capable but refuses to take into his confidence and impart information to the section.  He is essentially a one man operator.

IV.  ORGANIZATION OF PRU.

  1. Personnel – Colonel Cullen is Director of Operations.  Lt. Colonel Irish, his assistant, has no apparent understanding of primary principles involved, other than flying.
  2. EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES:
  1. Aircraft – At this date approximately 11 to 13 F-5’s of varying models are available.  This is an increase of some 8 A/C over the previous months.  Ten to eleven pilots are available.  The average of serviceable aircraft in the immediate past has been three.  In addition, shuttle pilots and craft from Italy and the U.K. have been utilized for varying periods before returning to home bases.  Ten pinpoints seems to be the average per sortie to date.
  2. Photo Lab. – The photo lab equipment is fairly rudimentary.  Additional equipment and personnel is expected shortly.  When received the estimated capacity will be in the neighborhood of 5000 prints per day.  At present, 1000 prints is maximum.

If negative is unavailable only a 4” x 5” print can be reproduced from prints since a C3 camera only is on hand.  A C1 has been ordered.

Personnel consists of 2 officers, 5 photo technicians, 2 clerks and 5 Russians.

  1. Interpretation – As previously stated Major Kellogg is the only Interpreter at the Base.  Three additional have been requested but their arrival is problematical.  One Russian Ground Interpreter gives parttime assistance.

Only the most rudimentary first phase interpretation is available.  Normal operations, if carried out regularly, would swamp this officer, since he has other duties.  As it is, there is a large backlog of unprocessed prints.  Industrial interpretation is completely lacking, as is report as to types of aircraft seen on airdromes covered.

  1. Dissemination
    1. A daily cable is sent to Spaatz for Doolittle and Eaker, covering targets photographed plus available first phase information.  Suggested to Colonel Cullen that Twining be added to address to speed up transmissions from Caserta to Fifteenth Air Force.
    2. All film is dispatched eventually to MAPRW.  However, due to present conditions, this is a rather irregular procedure.

V.  FIELD INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

            A.  In contrast to the Intelligence situation as outlined at headquarters, the Base situation is excellent and more than adequate from most viewpoints.  The three bases are well organized for Briefing and Interrogation.  The permanent personnel, though inadequate numerically, have a thorough understanding of the requisite Intelligence procedures.  They require only adequate coordination from either the Task Force Intelligence Officer or Eastern Command Headquarters to properly discharge their responsibilities.  In this regard wherever practicable, the Task Force Intelligence Officer should arrive at least three or four days in advance of the Mission.

            B.  PERSONNEL.

                        1.  Poltava – Capt. Feidt, Capt. Smith, three enlisted men.  Both outdoor and tent Briefing Rooms have been set up.  Bomber missions would necessitate the outdoor facility.  Adequate maps.

                        2.  Mirgorod – Lt. Morris, two enlisted men.  Large tented Briefing Room suitable for bomber missions.  Adequate maps.

                        3. Pyriatin – Capt. Fletcher, one enlisted man.  One of finest Briefing Rooms I’ve seen.  Maps Adequate.

                        4.  All fields have additional personnel trained sufficiently to assist in interrogation.

                              The officers all consider themselves as service teams to be used at the discretaion of the Task Force.  It is recommended they be permitted to function as organized.  Current interrogation forms and report requirements meet the demands of the Fifteenth Air Force.  Minor changes should be discouraged.

VI.  STATUS OF GROUND SOURCES (Appendix B).

            No effective contact has been established by Eastern Command with the Russian Intelligence Services, other than the receipt of sporadic airdrome cover and Army communiques.  Occasional EOB reports come in, with no evaluation or explanation as to source.

            It may very will be that no services such as Fifteenth Air Force is utilizing (OSS, CSDIC, British Special Ops) exists, but it may be assumed that certain channels of information have certainly been developed by the Red Army or Air Forces.  Colonel Cullen has presented questions in this regard to General Perminov at my suggestion, but in my opinion the manner of the request was much too general to admit of reply.

            Specific questions should be submitted to the Mission at Moscow for presentation to the Red Army.  The first of these, if prepared by Fifteenth Air Force, should be short and concise.  Once a channel is established, greater breadth of information may be requested.  It is important that complete explanation of the use of this information be supplied so that the request will not be considered solely as an inquiry into Russian Intelligence organization.  Simply put, such questions, I believe, will elicit a reply one way or the other.

            It is Colonel Cullens viewpoint expressed informally and off the record that the Mission in Moscow has failed properly to appreciate the Intelligence problems involved, and has likewise failed to gauge the Russian reactions properly.

VII.  MILITARY MISSION IN MOSCOW

            The complete absence of an oriented Intelligence attack was visible here.  The Air Division of the Mission was in process of reorganization and augmentation, as was the entire Mission.

            The Intelligence Staff consisted of Lt. Colonel De Sahknoffsky and Lt. Colonel Lord.  The former proffesses no knowledge of Strategic Air Force problems, and is used as an interpreter, guide and general Liaison officer.

            The latter has had 22 months experience mostly as Executive A-2 of the Second Air Force and is equally at sea insofar as Operational Intelligence is concerned.

            There is a general air of futility insofar as the problems relating to Intelligence planning, procurement, and Liaison is concerned.  Appendix B covers the memorandum I left with Colonel Gormly on this subject.

            While the present Bases are not in themselves of further economic value to this Air Force, the search for genuine Liaison and exchange of Intelligence with the Russians appears to be a worthwile project for future operations both West and East.

            I believe the Russian authorities would eventually be responsive to an Intelligence Section which could demonstrate a sense of forthright aptitude and knew specifically what answers it was seeking.

            In view of my limited stay, observations on the other aspects of the Mission will be delivered verbally if desired.

VIII.  ADDITIONAL NOTES

  1.  Flying Restrictions – At present our P.R.U. planes are restricted to five corridors or gates of exit and entry.  Three only are used each week. 

SARNY – 5150N – 2650E

BRODY – 5000N – 2500E

JASSY – 4710N – 2750E

LUSK – 5100N – 2500E

ODESSA-

            There are two viewpoints as to the restriction:  One being the Russians reluctance to having foreign planes, especially photographic, flying at will over the country, particularly, in view of the present offensive; the other, held by Colonel Cullen, that it is the only method of safeguarding our ships from Russian attack, since any A/C not specifically cleared is considered hostile.

            It must be realized that there is no overall flying control such as we know it.  This is due primarily to the lack of adequate lateral communications, and to the fact that the Air Arm is primarily a support weapon under the control of the several “Front” Commanders.

            Aircraft flying out of Russia, especially to the North must cross several Russian “Front” Commands.  All communications go back to Moscow then radiate to the various commands.  The difficulties of coordinated control is at once apparent, and the Russians are reluctant to expose our A/C to these hazards.

            All Missions must be cleared 30 hours in advance.  Those to the North in view of the Ground Activity in these Fronts are at present discouraged.

  1. According to Colonel Cullen the USSTAF doctrine holds that the shuttle operations are uneconomic and that the only justification for the operations is the bringing together of the two forces in the hopes they will learn to work together.  Prefer to express my viewpoints as seen here verbally.

IX.  FRANTIC III.

            Intelligence arrangements for interrogating, briefing, targeting, and reporting of the Shuttle Mission was adequate.  Lt. Colonel Gomez, Major Weld and Lt. Colonel Neveleff, with the aid of the Eastern Command staff, covered all necessary details.

            Major Weld, S-2 of the 82nd Fighter Group, in particular, is deserving of commendation.

            Base and dispersal field conditions have been covered in other reports.  Further comment is unnecessary.

 

L. A. NEVELEFF,

Lt. Colonel, A.C.,

Ass’t A-2.

 

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