Operation Reunion

III. PROCESSING

1. As soon as the planes landed, the personnel was met at the airfield and given an orientation talk by General Born or General Twining. “Thank God you’re back!” said General Twining. “We’ve sweated you out long time.” At General orientation meeting they were told that they would soon be sent home. Ambulances were on hand to take litter patients to the hospital. ALL other personnel were sent to the hospital in trucks for a checkup examination which consisted mostly of examining their feet, hearts, and lungs. Necessary cases were hospitalized. They then filled out record forms and were served sandwiches and hot coffee at the hospital. At this time they were told that they had the privilege of a full medical examination if they desired. Upon leaving the hospital they were trucked to the 22nd Replacement Battalion where they were deloused, bathed, issued new clothing, and assigned to quarters.
2. Then, in groups of twenty, they were brought to Headquarters, FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, for A-2 interrogation. Next, they were taken to the A-1 Combat Crew section, which, in connection with the AG Battle Casualty section, arranged for them to fill out forms so other necessary data could be obtained. Upon completion of this process they were sent to their units for approximately ten days before returning to the 22nd Replacement Battalion. From there it was planned to take them to Naples by special train on or about the tenth of September which will be in time for them to be returned to the United States by the first available water transportation.
3. Arrangements are now being made for this personnel to be billeted at the 19th Replacement Battalion for the time that they are in the Naples area and they will be trucked from the 19th directly to the boat at sailing time. ALL FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE personnel will be given FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE shoulder patches and a personal letter signed by GENERAL TWINING.
4. At the 22nd Replacement Battalion every effort was made to make this personnel as comfortable as possible. Extra rations were drawn so that all personnel had fresh meat and vegetables and additional supplies of cigarettes, candy, etc. The Red Cross cooperated in furnishing Red Cross kits containing toilet articles, cigarettes, etc., to this personnel. The personnel that were evacuated that had come from the EIGHTH and NINTH AIR FORCES were handled in precisely the same way but arrangements are now completed for them to be flown directly to UK in two C-47’s with extra tanks. They will be returned to the UK in the EIGHTH and NINTH AIR FORCES and will then be sent back to the United States from UK.
5. The FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE contemplates issuing a blanket order promoting all second lieutenants from this group of evacuees to first lieutenants prior to their being returned to the United States.
6. SECURITY. Returnees were ALL briefed immediately upon landing at Bari Airport and were told not to discuss any of their experiences with anyone until they had been properly indoctrinated at the time of interrogation. Subsequently ALL signed the following oath:

“I understand that any information concerning my escape or evasion from capture is SECRET and must not be disclosed to anyone other than the American Military Attaché to whom I first report or to an officer designated by the Commanding General of a theater of operations. I understand that disclosure action * will make me liable to disciplinary action.”

7. Identification was difficult to cross-check in many cases and was often left wholly on the individual’s say-so. In those cases where whole crews had been rescued, each substantiated the other’s identities. It would, however, have been relatively easy for imposters to have avoided detection.

IV. INTERROGATION

1. VIRTUALLY ALL the stories the men told were identical except in anecdotal detail, for virtually ALL had been captured at once and detained under the same general conditions. The detailed interrogations of Lt. Col. Gunn and Smith which are attached (TABS E & F) typify the line in assessing their talks with the 1162 people, the FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE’s Intelligence officers commented (TAB D):-

“On the whole, the attitude of the Roumanian people to the airmen was friendly, when they were shot down, they were usually greeted by Roumanians armed with pitchforks and occasionally by Roumanian soldiers, but no violence ever took place.

“IF captured by country folk, the airmen were taken to a house and given food while the locals sent word to the nearest police post. The Roumanians were always loyal to their country and handed over the airmen as soon as possible.

“Most of the men were shot down in the PLOESTI area and were taken to the Army Headquarters in PLOESTI where they had a short questioning, then were sent to the PW Camps in BUCHAREST.

“Before actually entering these camps, the airmen were held at King MICHAEL’S REGIMENT GARRISON for a short time and again questioned. They were given a form with a number of personal questions which, they were told, were necessary for informing the Red Cross of their location. Most of the airmen filled in the forms as far as personal and home questions were concerned, but ALL refused to answer the military interrogations.

“One or two airmen were interrogated from their fellow men and sent to a police station across the road from the main camp. Here they were put in solitary confinement for 48 hours or less, very mildly questioned. They refused to answer any questions and were told that were quite within their rights if the interrogator had ever met.

“When the PW lived a normal life they were only subjected to a normal treatment, and certainly they received partial treatment. The food was very poor at first, but that was improved when arrangements were made for the PW’s to be paid.

“Conditions in the PW camp were not quite so good as in the officers’ camp. Food was the main difference. The 2nd was about the same food as the Roumanian soldiers – a bowl of watery soup, a piece of black bread, a cup of weak tea or coffee and a piece of black bread for breakfast.

 “Recreational facilities in the camps were poor. Volley ball was played and later basketball in the officers’ camp. Books were available, but until the Y.M.C.A. took over – BEFORE THE CAPITULATION OF THE Roumanian Government, these had been supplied by a woman social worker – AND WERE MOSTLY GERMAN. Plays were organized by the PW’s themselves. With the exception of help from the camp authorities, the Services were held on Sunday in the officers’ camp, but it was only after a great deal of agitation on the part of the officers that Red Cross parcels were allowed to hold services in the Red Cross and the hospital.

“Washing facilities in the camp were poor, although there was plenty of cold water available. Latrines for the number of men were of the squat type and were filthy. Latrines for the number to be extended for.”

2. Health. Two detailed medical reports are attached (TABS G & H). Excerpts:-

“Until June 1944, the only POW hospital in BUCHAREST was a small four-room building in the Enlisted Men’s camp, run by an American officer and three sergeants. The conditions in this hospital, in which there were thirty enlisted men and ten officers, were very bad. They were not allowed to sleep on wooden bed boards without a mattress, the bedding was seldom changed, and one sheet which was changed about once a month.

“There was no Roumanian staff attached to the hospital so that ALL the work of nursing and keeping the building clean had to be done by the three sergeants.

“The rooms under normal circumstances would have been quite well ventilated but with the overcrowding and the small number of beds, the atmosphere was unbearable.

“Food for the patients had to be carried from the Main Camp, constituting mainly of weak vegetable soup in quality, and weak tea or coffee and a piece of bread for lunch and dinner.

“The officer patients got slightly better food as the POW’s were fed under shelter, but more often as the Roumanian Army where the O’s ate maize porridge, soup and black bread while the officers have meat, etc.

“No special diets were available for POW’s suffering from jaundice, ulcers or stomach troubles although milk was sometimes issued.

“No Red Cross parcels were received and only one visit was paid by the Red Cross prior to the evacuating the three months visited frequently by a woman of the Roumanian Blue Cross organization.

 “ALL the patients interviewed observed that the general standard of the medical care which they received in Roumania was much inferior to that to which they have become accustomed in the United States. They noticed that the doctors in general did not appear well trained, although there were, of course, some exceptions to this observation. The nursing care was poor and there was a great scarcity of all types of medical appliances and equipment. SULFA drugs were used on a large scale by the Germans, but supplies were LIMITED on the other hand those patients who received medical attention from the Germans before being released to the Roumanians, observed that their equipment was good and their medical supplies ample. This caused some bitterness on the part of the Roumanian medical officers, who complained that while the Germans had ample medical supplies, they would not release these materials to the Roumanians.

“The low general standard of medical proficiency reported by our airmen is confirmed by a review of the hospitalized cases. The statements of the patients, that repatriation of the returnees were performed at the slightest provocation, are supported by the LARGE number of small cases, many supported by the lack of drugs. This is partly explained by the fear of infection on the part of the Roumanian doctors, a fear somewhat justified because of the lack of drugs. This, however, would not explain some of the amputations which appeared to result from their policy when in doubt, amputate.”

3. Cases of Ill Treatment. For the most part the returnees stated that they had not been afforded any ill treatment while in Roumanian hands. There are only a few cases of ill treatment noted. One of these cases involved a special group of 033 personnel who were captured. These men were not beaten up or physically maltreated in any way but were put in solitary confinement for 90 days. The first 14 days they were kept in complete darkness, were taken out, questioned and then put back in complete darkness for another 30 to 24 days. They were taken out, questioned again and placed back in ordinary confinement for the rest of the 90 day period. At the end of this period they were put in with the other prisoners. Another case of ill treatment did not involve physical violence. Staff Sergeant Peter J. Beyerle escaped from confinement and was re-captured by the Roumanians. He was sentenced to solitary confinement for 10 days and was put into an extremely dirty cell. After 6 days confinement a Colonel who was commandant of the camp came to visit him. The Colonel was intoxicated and was persuaded to release Sergeant Beyerle who was then allowed to mingle with the other prisoners for a two-week period. At the end of this period he was put on a train to Slobask (a correction camp for Russians), was held at this camp for about one month. During this time he received half rations of food. He was placed in a small room with 25 Russian partisans, received no exercise, although he stated he did chop wood for exercise. He and the Russians were locked in the room at night and were not allowed outside at all. Pens in the room were the only means they had of relief. The only water they had for washing was in a bucket which was brought to the room and a mug to scoop the water out. There were no basins in the room or heating facilities. They were not permitted any tobacco or cigarettes. During the month that Sgt. Beyerle was there he underwent no physical violence. It is considered, however, that this was a second punishment for the same offense in violation of Geneva Convention rules.
4. Morale. By the time the evacuees had been deloused and fed at Bari their morale was top-notch. In Roumania, however, it appears to have suffered a low. Col. Kreiger, commenting, expressed dread that they might not be able to “take it again” if returned to combat duty and evincing an eagerness to leave out the war in the lush Bucharest villas that suddenly opened to them after August 23rd. No evidence emerged, however, to indicate that any of the evacuees had originally bailed out deliberately to avoid further combat.
5. Capture Intelligence. No data about the enemy of any value was produced by any of the rescued men. This was attributed by the interrogators to the fact that all had been captured immediately. Apparently this was not true – many of the evacuees appear to have let much too much information out of the bag to their captors. Captain Parson, who interrogated several of the group early in the processing of the evacuees, stated that he was impressed with the laxity in security of the returnees while they were in Roumanian hands. It was his impression that they were easily drawn out by their interrogators, being coaxed into arguments and discussions in which they gave out considerable information. The Roumanians would also speak freely of the information they already had, which appeared to be considerable, and the prisoners would then fill in with additional information. The impression gained is that the Roumanians knew a day in advance of an impending raid, which impressed the prisoners very much. They would also tell the prisoners the position of planes in the formation and the number of planes in the formation and would thereby obtain additional information from the prisoners. Many of the prisoners carried diaries on their flights and these diaries were the source of considerable intelligence data for the Roumanians. Another source was laundry tags on clothing which gave the location of units. Some of the crews claimed that they had never been briefed as to what they should or should not say upon capture by the enemy. It is felt that briefing of crews as to their behavior after capture has not been sufficiently emphasized and that the giving of only name, rank and serial number should be emphatically stressed.
6. Public Relations. Operation REUNION was regarded by newspaper correspondents in Italy as the biggest air story yet (TAB K). To help them cover it, a selected seven correspondents were flown in to Bucharest with the rescue formation, while others flocked to Bari in a C-47 plane. ALL told they filed 100,000 words about it; on the first day the wordage came within a few thousand of equaling that filed on D-Day of the Invasion of Southern France.
7. Relations with Roumanians and Russians. It was very evident that the Roumanian officials and population in general were very anxious to bend over backwards to gain the good will of the United States and their representatives and to impress them with the fact that they were now co-belligerents and wanted to be on the same relative status as the Italians. The impression gained is that the Roumanians do not want the Russians to take over their country and, as a preventive to such a move, strongly desire the either American or British forces – preferably American – to be stationed or standing by in Roumania. By the time REUNION III was in process the Russians had begun to requisition what and where they found it. This included some of the vehicles being used by the Americans. In no other respect, however, did the Russians thwart or interfere with the American air activity. Few Russian aircraft were visible and those ignored the U.S. bombers. Col. Kreiger, as a precaution, called on the Russian Colonel in command in Bucharest, told him about the U.S. evacuation plans. The Russian courteously agreed to inform the Red Air Forces.

V. CONCLUSION

1. It is the opinion of the M.A.A.F. committee that

a. OPERATIONALLY the FIFTEENTH did a well-nigh perfect job.

b. The processing of the evacuees was likewise exemplary, with the possible exception of interrogation. It is believed that, due to the size and suddenness of the task, not as much information was obtained from the evacuees as might be desired. Since similar largescale rescues are likely in the near future, it is suggested that a detailed questionnaire be worked out and that it be S.O.P. in such cases hereinafter for each evacuee to fill out such a questionnaire himself, after being interrogated in the usual fashion.

c. Greater emphasis should be placed on briefing crews about how to avoid revealing information if captured.

JAMES PARTON, Lt. Col., A.C., E. H. NELSON, Lt. Col., A.C., NORMAN APL, Major, A.C.

 

------------------- Additional Narrative

 

B-24’s and B-17’s on many occasions. When Roumania gave up, he kept a wary eye on the Germans occupying Roumanian A/D and flew his whole group to Popesti A/D near Bucharest. In the next few days when the Germans savagely unloaded their remaining bomb stocks on the hapless Roumanian capital, Cantacuzino’s Group climbed into their planes, of which the Captain bagged four himself. In the four days between 23 and 27 August he had swung full circle from shooting down ALLIED bombers to destroying German. This troubled him not a whit. He was, he said blandly, a soldier who fought whenever he was told to fight.

4. At 1920 hours on the 27th the tower at San Giovanni, Italy, Col. Gunn’s home field, was mildly astonished to see an Me 109 slip in to land. It taxied up and was at once surrounded by a curious throng. Cantacuzino, obviously enjoying himself, stood up in the cockpit, announced that he had a surprise for them and called for a screw-driver. The plates in the fuselage was then opened and the C.O. of the 454th Group hauled forth before his cheering men.
5. Gunn flew at once to Bari and sat down with Brigadier General Charles Born, Director of Operations at the FIFTEENTH, to evolve a rescue plan. Operation GUNN (TAB A) was laid out on the 25th and took place on the 29th. Its first phase consisted of 3 P-51’s, one piloted by Cantacuzino, flying back to Popesti A/D to make sure it was safe for the evacuation. Cantacuzino was to land there and signal his two companions by Very pistol. They had secret orders to shoot him down if he behaved suspiciously on the way in. ALL went well, however. Cantacuzino landed and promptly shot off the double yellow star which meant that the field was still in Roumanian hands.

The two remaining P-51’s at once climbed to altitude and flashed a signal to a weather plane flying home over Jugoslavia.

 

Tabs (e.g., TAB A, E, F, G, H, J, K) are referenced but not included.

 

 15th AFHQ